An exploratory study of expectations, uncertainty and farm plans in southern Iowa agriculture by Kaldor, Donald R. & Heady, Earl O.
Volume 31
Number 408 An exploratory study of expectations,
uncertainty and farm plans in southern Iowa
agriculture
Article 1
April 1954
An exploratory study of expectations, uncertainty
and farm plans in southern Iowa agriculture
Donald R. Kaldor
Iowa State College
Earl O. Heady
Iowa State College
Follow this and additional works at: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/researchbulletin
Part of the Agriculture Commons, Economics Commons, and the Sociology Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Iowa Agricultural and Home Economics Experiment Station Publications at Iowa State
University Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Bulletin (Iowa Agriculture and Home Economics Experiment Station) by
an authorized editor of Iowa State University Digital Repository. For more information, please contact digirep@iastate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kaldor, Donald R. and Heady, Earl O. (1954) "An exploratory study of expectations, uncertainty and farm plans in southern Iowa
agriculture," Research Bulletin (Iowa Agriculture and Home Economics Experiment Station): Vol. 31 : No. 408 , Article 1.
Available at: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/researchbulletin/vol31/iss408/1
An Exploratory Study of Expectations, 
Uncertainty and FarIA Plans in 
Southern Iowa Agriculture 
by Donald R. Kaldor and Earl O. Heady • 
Department of Economics and Sociology • 
AGRICULTURAL EXPERIMENT STATION, IOWA STATE COLLEGE 
RESEARCH BULI.ETIN 40B • • APRI", J954 • • AMES, IOWA 

CONTENTS 
Page 
Summary _____________________________________________________ 840 
Introduction ___________________________________________________ 841 
Empirical basis of study ______________________________________ 842 
Sample ____________________________________________________ 842 
Limitations ________________________________________________ 843 
Production planning by the agricultural firm __________________ 844 
Expectational period _______________________________________ 845 
Farmers' price expectations __________________________________ 846 
Formulation of price expectations __________________________ 847 
Annual price expectations __________________________________ 848 
Errors in annual expectations ____________________________ 850 
Farmer and professional forecasts ________________________ 854 
Subjective price uncertainty ____________________________ 854 
Range of expected prices ____________________________ 856 
Skewness of expected prices _________________________ 858 
Consistency of errors of expectation ______________________ 859 
Long-range price expectations ______________________________ 859 
Revisions in price expectations ____________________________ 861 
Revisions after a 6-month interval ___________ ___________ 863 
Revisions in long-term expectations ____________________ 866 
Choice between certain and uncertain prices ________________ 867 
Price uncertainty and hog production ______________________ 869 
Crop yield expectations ______________________________________ 871 
Yield uncertainty __________________________________________ 874 
Feed reserves ____________________________________________ 876 
Fertilizer and lime ________________________________________ 877 
Enterprise uncertainty and livestock production ________________ 879 
Production plans and their modification ________________________ 880 
Annual crop and livestock plans ____________________________ 881 
Reasons for changes in plans and operations ________________ 883 
Crops __________________________________________________ 885 
Livestock plans ________________________________________ 885 
840 
SUMMARY 
1. This bulletin reports the find-
ings of an exploratory investigation of 
farmers' price and yield expectations 
and production plans in Southern 
Iowa. The study is based on infor-
mation collected from a sample of 186 
farmers during four surveys conducted 
between December 1947 and June 1949. 
2. Production planning in an un· 
certain environment is usually ac-
companied by: (1) discounting of ex-
pected values, (2) providing for flexi-
bility and liquidity, and (3) errors in 
entrepreneurial expectations. Conse-
quently producers are unable to maxi-
mize ex post profits, and resources are 
not used most efficiently. 
3. Most farmers' price predictions 
showed large errors. Prices of some 
products were overestimated; others 
underestimated. Substantial inter· 
farmer variation in forecast errors 
existed for most commodities. If 
farmers developed their prodilCtion 
plans on the basis of their price ex-
pectations, one might expect impor· 
tant maladjustments both in the pat-
tern of production and in the distri-
bution of output on different farms. 
4. The large range of prices speci· 
fied for corn and hogs indicated that 
producers felt a good deal of uncer· 
tainty in their forecasts. Apparently 
farmers had more confidence in their 
forecasts for hogs than in those for 
corn; they also had more confidence 
in their 1949 forecasts than in their 
1948 forecasts. 
5. No significant correlation was 
found between the forecasting errors 
of individual farmers for corn in 1948 
and 1949. In contrast, a significant 
correlation existed between products 
for the same farmer in the same year. 
If this is generally true, it means that 
diversified production would not pro· 
duce compensating effects with respect 
to errors of expectation. 
6. A comparison of farmers' hog 
plans under conditions of uncertainty 
with projected plans in the absence 
of uncertainty suggests that producers 
discount heavily for price uncertainty. 
In December 1947 farmers indicated 
that if the prices of corn and hogs 
were guaranteed at the levels con-
sidered most probable for 1948, they 
would farrow an average of 66 per-
cent more spring pigs than they were 
actually planning to farrow. 
7. It was found that individual 
yield forecasts for 1948 involved large 
errors, amounting on the average to 
about 19 bushels per acre for corn, 
13 bushels for oats, and 0.8 ton for 
hay. Since farmers indicated ther 
normally carry only small feed re-
serves-estimated to average 10 per-
cent of the feed needed for the average 
livestock program-a substantial de· 
cline in yields, associated with un· 
predictable weather changes, would 
necessitate major adjustments in long-
range livestock plans unless feed could 
be moved into the area. 
8. Average production plans for 
1948 and 1949 did not differ materially 
from the average of actual operations 
during the preceding year. Further-
more, only minor revisions were made 
in average plans between December 
and the following June. However, in 
the years under study, planned in-
creases by some farmers were nearly 
offset by planned decreases by others. 
When mean adjustments were com· 
puted with negative and positive signs 
disregarded, the actual changes in 
plans were large compared to the 
average quantities produced by alI 
farms in the sample. 
9. Among the reasons given by pro-
ducers for short-term changes in crop 
plans, rotation sequences accounted 
for the most changes. Modifications 
in tenure arrangements were men· 
tioned as the second most important 
reason. Price changes were fourth 
in importance. 
10. Price·cost considerations were 
more important in explaining changes 
and planned changes in livestock than 
in crops. During 1948, livestock plans 
were greatly intiuenced by the 1947 
drouth which had sharply curtailed 
forage and grain SUpplies in the area. 
An Exploratory Study of Expectations, 
Uncertainty and Farm Plans in 
Southern Iowa Agriculture 
By DONALD R. KALDOB AND EARL O. HEADY 
Decision-making without complete 
knowledge is a problem of major signifi. 
cance in the agricultural economy. 
Because of uncertainty, production 
planning is frequently imperfect. This 
results in lower incomes for farm 
people and a mis·allocation of pro-
ductive resources. 
Uncertainty may prevent production 
at minimum cost; it may interfere with 
the optimum adjustment of the com-
position of agricultural output to the 
pattern of market demand. Moreover, 
it can operate as a major obstacle in 
achieving the most efficient farm size. 
In a world of certainty, farmers 
could always select the resource com-
binations and the production tech-
niqt1es which would minimize the cost 
of producing any given volume of out-
put. There would be no maladjust-
ments in the composition of output 
because farmers could always deter-
mine the most profitable proportions 
in which to produce various products. 
Capital rationing would no longer limit 
the size of the agricultural firm. There 
would be more soil conservation since 
farmers would find it to their ad· 
vantage to make larger investments 
in those types of soil resources that 
are transformed into products in the 
more distant future. Some of the 
leasing and tenure problems would 
disappear along with those of farm 
indebtedness. 
Great strides have been made 
through research to improve agri-
cultural technology, but comparatively 
1 Projects 1007 and 1134, Iowa Agrlcul· 
tUral Experiment Station. Previous em-
pirical research in this area undertaken 
at the Iowa Station Is reported in Two 
trials to investigate expectation models 
applicable to agriculture, by T. W. 
Schultz and O. H. Brownlee, QUarterly 
Jour. Econ., Vol. LVI, May 1942 and in 
Farmers' price anticipations and the role 
of uncertainty in farm planning, by O. 
H, Brownlee and 'Valter Gainer, Jour. 
Farm Econ., Vol. XXXI, No.2, May 
1949. 
little progress has been made to solve 
the planning problems of farmers in 
an uncertain environment. Farmers 
are quick to suggest that the problems 
growing out of imperfect knowledge 
are among the most important ones 
they face. The often heard remarl{ 
"farming is nothing but a big gamble" 
is a refiection of this belief. 
Because of its fundamental impor-
tance and because so little research 
has been undertaken, the problem of 
uncertainty in agriculture represents 
a significant field of investigation. The 
problem is complex and probably this 
has discouraged study. Nevertheless, 
research is needed along several lines 
including (1) further development of 
the theory of maximizing behavior 
under conditions of uncertainty; (2.) 
an examination of the process where-
by farmers formulate expectations and 
plans; (3) an appraisal of the effects 
of uncertainty upon allocative effi-
ciency in agriculture; (4) an investi-
gation of the opportunities provided 
by existing institutions for reducing 
uncertainty, for increasing the .ac-
curacy of expectations. and for makmg 
expectations and plans more consis-
tent· and (5) an evaluation of the 
Possibilities offered by pubUc policies 
for eliminating uncertainty and for 
decreasing its impact upon agriculture. 
The present study is largelr ex-
ploratory in nature, partly designed 
to provide a more adequate back-
ground for future research. Attention 
is focused mainly on farmers' price and 
yield expectations. The study ex-
amines the manner in which expec-
tations are formed, the degree of sub-
jective uncertainty attached to price 
expectations and the errors involved 
in farmers' price forecasts. Some con-
sideration is given to farmers' plans, 
to the relation between expectations 
and plans, and to the effects of un-
certainty upon production. 
842 
EMPIRICAL BASIS OF STUDY 
The study is based upon primary 
data collected by personal interview 
from a sample of farmers located in 
Southern Iowa. Southern Iowa was 
selected because it is a comparatively 
high risk area for crop production. 
It was also thought that the study 
might be helpful in developing the 
program of farm management edu-
cation planned for the area by the Iowa 
Agricultural Extension Service. 
Four surveys were conducted at ap-
proximately 6-month intervals between 
December 1947 and June 1949 to ex-
amine changes in expectations and 
plans over time. Even a 2-year period, 
however, was insufficient to accurately 
measure the effects of uncertain expec-
tations upon farmers' production plans. 
The questionnaires obtained infor-
mation about the nature of farmers' 
expectations, the degree of subjective 
price uncertainty and the effects or· 
uncertainty upon plans." In addition, 
they obtained farmers' revisions in ex-
pectations and plans during the annual 
production period. This was needed 
to identify factors influencing short· 
rJ,1ll decisions and to determine the 
effect of the length of the forecast 
period upon the accuracy of expec-
tations. Several questions measured 
the comparative degree of uncertainty 
associated with different farm enter-
prises and appraised farmers' risk 
preferences. 
The questions dealing with price ex-
pectations were duplicated in each 
survey. Farmers were asked to esti-
mate the most probable price dUring 
a specific future month for each of the 
major farm products or the area. The 
products and months were as follows: 
eggs in May, butterfat in June, grain-
fed cattle in July, oats in August, 
feeder cattle in October, soybeans in 
November, and corn and hogs in De-
cember. The price forecasts involved 
periods ranging from a few months to 
several years. 
Farmers \\'ere also asked to estimate 
the price range which they expected 
2 Copies of the questionnaires may be OIl' 
tained from the Department of Econom· 
ics and· Sociology, Iowa State College, 
Ames, Iowa. 
for corn and hogs. To insure greater 
comparability, these estimates were 
made on the assumption that prices 
higher and lower than those specified 
by the estimated range had a 1 in 
100 chance of being realized." The 
price range, along with the most prob-
able price, gave three points of the 
"distribution" of expected prices. 
The information provided by farmers 
relating to expectations and plans was 
of a subjective character, although 
most of it was in quantitative terms. 
It is only in an ex post sense that 
prices and production operations be-
come observable. If expected and real-
ized values were the same-as they 
would be in a world of perfect 
knowledge-there would be no need 
to distinguish between them. It is the 
failure of these two values to cor· 
respond that gives rise to important 
decision·making problems facing farm-
ers. This gives significance to farm-
ers' subjective expectations and plans 
for purposes of economic analysis. 
The questionnaires were field tested 
before each enumeration. In order to 
increase consistency in the interpre-
tation of questions, only full-time staff 
members and graduate students served 
as enumerators. The surveys were 
well received and were looked upon by 
farmers as highly relevant to their 
major farming problems. 
SAMPLE 
A double sample design was used in 
this study. The population inClUded 
farmers operating units larger than 
30 acres located in a 10·county area 
of Southern Iowa. A stratified random 
sample of 96 segments was selected 
in the 10·county area shown in fig. 1.' 
The Initial sample consisted of 756 
farmers. 
3 The application of probable inferenee 
to propositions dealing with "ingular 
events is discussed by :\Iorris R. Cohen 
and Ernest Na~el in An introduction to 
logic and scientiflc method. Harcourt, 
Brace and Company, New York. 1934 . 
• The Statistical Laboratory, Iowa State 
College, selected the stratified random 
sample of area segments providing the 
Initial sample of 756 farmers. 
843 
)"- • K'O~ 1IoC ...... OOO ..... &0""'. ,",_, .. 6t' _0.'. _.ph .. .. 0:-"''''' • .. -., ..... ... -, } I-' ....... c ... • ........ 0" uuo __ ..... I. .. " ........ ... ,., . " ....... 
(MOW" , ... ,.. .. _·.·,.ta ............ , .. ..... ........ II ....... ........ .. •• 1. .. 
f::;;;i;-
... "",.-.. 
_ .._ .. 
1"~'" L- f r- -_ ..... _ .-
u _ 
I I . ,- ""'11' • .- . --~ 
'\ U._ ..... ..... Do._ r .. ·· \_ .. 1"0" I-"'~' ~ .. -.~ """) (''''0 ~~: .. ,--l ~-, I-~' .... ...., .... _ ........ _. _ ....- ... """":: 
-, ..... ,-
1""-"- r- .~~ _ ... - -.11- -- l-"~' \"'"- r'~'~'~ t-· 
_u --." .. ,. ~- _."'" . 
-" 
........ - ......... 
-; . ... ," . 
•• . -.. . . 
.. .......... 
• • ~' .... . . · -... .. : . 
fk_' 
-
........ 
-;0-';' • . , . ..... • tor"·· --.~. .. 1-•• • ... \ • . . • • • •• · • •• .. o 0 . · • 0 .. 0 .. 
· 
. . • • 
Fig. 1. Location of area sampling segments in Southern Iowa. 
Because the amount of capital a 
farmer has might affect his planning 
decisions, it was decided to stratifiy 
the final sample by the amount of 
capital. On the basis of a survey of 
equity capital conducted in August 
1947, farmers were classified into 37 
capital groups, and equal numbers-ex-
cept where the frequencies were too 
small-were drawn at random from 
each group to make a sample of 200 
farmers. 
After the data were obtained, it was 
found that little could be accomplished 
by relating capital position to the ef· 
fects of expectations upon plans. Popu-
lation estimates of means and totals 
were derived by weighting the values 
for each capital group by the relatiVe 
frequency in the original sample. In· 
asmuch as no correlation existed be-
tween expectations and capital posi-
tion, frequency distributions of price 
expectations were not weighted. 
Although the sample as drawn con-
tained 200 observation units, enumer· 
ation loss reduced the sample size to 
186 units. Farmers were retained in 
the sample only if four useable sched-
ules were furnished. Death, retire-
ment, illness and miscellaneous causes 
accounted for a loss of 14 farmers. 
LIMITATIONS 
Difficult problems are encountered in 
designing questionnaires and collecting 
accurate information- dealing with ex· 
pectations and plans. Additional stud-
ies are needed to perfect the methods 
of collecting and analyzing data of 
this type. 
In order to study farmers' reactions 
to uncertainty, several questions based 
on hypothetical conditions were used. 
While farmers usually provided ready 
answers, there is always a question 
whether the answers would be the same 
if they were actually confronted with 
the situation. 
Each farmer in the sample was con-
tacted five times during the study. 
Although the original sample was un-
biased, repeated contacts with the same 
farmers may have introduced a bias. 
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Farmers knew when the enumerators 
would return to ask similar questions; 
as a result many of them undoubtedly 
gave outlook reports more study. In 
addition, the loss of 14 farms, while 
comparatively small; slightly altered 
the composition of the sample. 
While many of the estimates of this 
study are subject to the same limi-
tations as other subjective data, they 
do relate to phenomena which are ob-
servable ex post and they are in 
quantitative terms. For these reasons 
they probably present fewer problems 
of interpretation than data dealing 
with individual values or ends. 
PRODUCTION PLANNING BY THE AGRICULTURAL FIRM 
The principal elements of the prob-
lem of planning production are (1) 
the objective of maximizing profits 
over time; (2) the means for accom-
plishing the objective, consisting of 
the land, labor and capital resources 
available to the firm; (3) the technical 
relationships (substitution and trans-
formation functions), market prices 
and institutional arrangements which 
condition planning decisions; and (4) 
a rationale for organizing the use of 
resources, setting forth the conditions 
that are necessary for profits to be a 
maximum. The responsibility for solv-
ing the problem rests with the farmer-
manager who makes the plans and 
translates them into action, and as-
sumes the burden of financial loss 
when expectations fail to materialize. 
In making plans aimed at maximum 
profits, the farmer must decide the 
kinds and quantities of products; the 
production techniques and resource 
combinations to be used in turning 
out the appropriate volume of each 
product; and the overall quantities of 
resources to be combined with his 
management to give the optimum size 
farm. Since these decisions are inter-
related the farmer has to integrate the 
various parts into a consistent plan 
for his farm as a whole. 
If profits are to be maximi7.ed, the 
production plan must satisfy the fol-
lowing marginal conditions ex post: 
(1) In the choice of product combi-
nations, the marginal rate of substi-
tution between any two products must 
be equal to the ratio of their prices. 
(2) In the selection of resource com-
binations. the marginal rate of sub-
stitution between any two production 
factors must be equal to the ratio of 
their prices. (3) In the choice of re-
source quantities, the marginal rate of 
transformation between any factor and 
any product must be equal to the 
factor-product price ratio. (4) And 
these equalities must hold for both 
temporal and intertemporal substi-
tutions and transformations.5 
With perfect knowledge the farmer 
could develop a plan that satisfied these 
conditions. Since he would have com-
plete knowledge of production tech-
niques, SUbstitution and transfor-
mation relationships and prices of 
factors and products, expected values 
would always correspond to realized 
values. The primary task of manage-
ment would be adjUsting the use of 
resources for changes in relative 
prices, technology and weather and 
disease conditions. But these changes 
would not prevent the farmer from 
maximizing his profits. Because these 
changes would be known in advance, 
appropriate adjustments could be made 
in plans. With perfect knowledge the 
optimum ex ante plan would corre-
spond to the optimum ex post plan. 
However, in the real ,,"orld of im-
perfect knowledge, the profit maxi-
mizing conditions cannot be fully satis-
fied in an ex ante fashion. If they 
happen to be fulfilled ex post, it's more 
likelv to be the result of coincidence 
rather than deliberate planning_ There 
are three major reasons for this: 
(1) In developing his production 
plan the farmer must predict substi-
tution and transformation rates and 
price ratios_ For this he can depend on 
his own experience, the experience of 
other farmers and public and private 
research. Predictions based upon the 
• The conditions. as stated. assume real-
Istlcallv that the individual farmer can-
not influence the prices at which he 
buys and sells. They also imply (1) 
that the second order conditions are sat-
isfied. and (2) that the substitution and 
transformation relationships are con-
tinuous. For the discontinuous case It 
I" nece"sal'Y to re-state the conditions 
in terms of InequalitieR. 
best available information, however, 
are likely to involve substantial errors. 
Since the typical farmer does not 
possess the best information available, 
it is reasonable that his estimates in-
volve even larger errors. Insofar as 
farmers develop their prodUction plans 
on the basis of expected values, any 
discrepancy between expected and re-
alized values would prevent the profit 
maximizing conditions from being ful-
filled ex post. If the farmer's ex-
pectations were single-valued, however, 
he could formulate an optimum plan 
based on these expectations. 
(2) But since the farmer recog-
nizes that his estimates of future val-
ues probably involve significant error, 
he seldom treats a yield or price ex-
pectation in a single-valued sense. He 
may form some notion of a most prob-
able value, realizing that other out-
comes are entirely possible. In ad-
dition, he may consider some extreme 
values as so unlikely that he disre-
gards them completely in making his 
plans." 
The range of values, he takes into 
account, together with his subjective 
notions about the skewness of the 
"distribution," reflect in ,part the de-
gree of uncertainty of his expectations. 
This conditions his production plans. 
Because of uncertainty, the farmer 
discounts expected prices and sub-
stitution and transformation rates. 
And the greater his uncertainty, the 
greater his rate of discount is Iikel~' 
to be, given his preference for un-
certainty bearing. As a consequence, 
he is not lilmly to push' his plans to 
the point where the profit maximizing 
conditions are fulfilled. Instead, he 
stops before marginal rates are equated 
with the price ratios as an allowance 
for uncertainty-the chance that his 
estimates may be in error ·and realized 
values may be unfavorable. 
(3) Aside from people who receive 
direct enjoyment from undertaking un-
certain ventures, most managers will 
incorporate various precautions and 
safeguards into their plans. They 
may maintain a part of their resources 
in highly liquid form. In the absence 
• See Oscar Lan~e, Price flexibility and 
employment. The Principia Press, Inc. 
Bloomington, Ind. 1944. 
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of uncertainty the firm could put these 
resources to work to increase profits. 
In addition, managers may provide 
for flexibility in plans so that re-
visions can be made if unexpected 
conditions arise. The provisions for 
flexibility usually involve a .choice of 
resource combinations and production 
techniques that make for higher pro-
duction costs at outputs near the 
point of minimum average cost, but 
lower costs at high or loW levels of 
output. For these reasons maximum 
profits, ex post, are never quite at-
tained. 
Formulation of accurate expectations 
and development of consistent produc-
tion plans are, both essential aspects 
of successful management. If expec-
tations are not realized, ex post prof-
its cannot be maximized even though 
plans are consistent with' expectations. 
Even though expected and realized 
values correspond, profits will be lower 
if plans are not consistent with ex-
pectations. ' 
It is, of course, possible that poor 
planning may' compensate for inac-
curate expectations. No business, 
however, could continue to operate 
over a period of time on the principle 
that plans should be developed in-
dependently of expectations. 
EXPECTATIONAL PERIOD 
The time period for which expec-
tations are formulated depends upon 
the length of the planning period. 
Different decisions involve commit-
ments over periods of varying du-
ration. For example, the decision to 
construct a dairy barn involves a long-
run commitment and the planning 
period is likewise long. On the other 
hand, a decision to expand the acreage 
in soybeans at 'the expense of corn 
may not involve a commitment longer 
than a year or two. 
Price and technical expectations ex-
tending over a period of many years 
are of crucial importance in many of 
the farmer's decisions. The decision 
to enter or leave farming, purchase 
land, build-up or deplete soil fertility 
and mal{8 basic changes in farm or-
ganization rest heavily on long-range 
expectations. They are particularly 
significant in determining the form of 
. 846 
major farm investments such as those 
in buildings, machinery, breeding stock 
and land resources. The accuracy of 
the producer's long-range expectations 
is a critical factor affecting agri-
culture's capacity to make those re-
source adjustments needed for maxi-
mum efficiency in a progressive econo· 
my. Serious errors in long-run ex-
pectations may mean the difference be-
tween a rising or declining income. 
Long-range plans based on long-
period expectations determine the type 
of farming and general structure of 
resource use on the individual farm. 
During a short period there are im-
portant restrictions on the adjust· 
ments a farmer can make in his re-
source organization. Long-range plans 
introduce certain rigidities into the 
resource structure. For example, in-
vestment in specialiZed forms of dur-
able capital goods reduces the adapta-
bility of capital resources. Long-run 
commitments in buildings, machinery 
and breeding stock mean that short-run 
adjustments must take place within 
the framework set by long-range plans. 
As a consequence, short-period plans-
such as those for the year ahead-are 
generally concerned with marginal ad-justments in longer-run plans. These 
adjustments, in turn, are influenced 
by the kind of short-period price and 
technical expectations held by pro-
ducers. 
FARMERS' PRICE EXPECTATIONS 
The effects of price expectations 
upon production plans depend partly 
on the direction and magnitude of the 
expected price changes, and on the 
confidence the farmer places in them. 
The direction and magnitude of these 
movements will determine what ad· 
justments in plans 'are consistent with 
the farmer's production goal, while the 
degree of subjective uncertainty will 
influence his willingness to take action 
to modify his resource organization. 
In this study the farmer's price ex-
pectation is represented by his "most 
probable price," while his degree of 
corifidence is assumed to be reflected 
in the range of expected prices and 
in the skewness of the distribution. 
Skewness is the algebraic sum of the 
differences between the upper and 
lower limits of the range of expected 
prices and the most probable price. 
The range is employed as a measure 
of the variation in expected prices! 
For it is reasonable to suppose that 
the larger the range of anticipated 
prices, the greater the degree of sub-
jective uncertainty. It is likewise 
reasonable that a person is more con-
fident in his most probable price if, 
given the range of expected prices, 
the distribution is positively skewed. 
This implies that a person would have 
more confldence in his expected price 
if he anticipates that the "chances" 
• See Lange. op. cit., p. 29. 
of the realized price being higher than 
the most probable price are greater 
than the "chances" of it being lower. 
This may be illustrated diagrammati-
cally. 
In fig. 2, OP represents the most 
probable price and OM the marginal 
opportunity cost of producing hogs. It 
is assumed that price and technical 
expectations are single-valued for other 
products and that technical expec-
tations are single-valued for hogs. 
First, suppose that the farmer's price 
expectation for hogs (OP) is also 
single-valued. In this case he might 
be expected to plan a quantity equal 
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Fig. 2. Illustration of the effect of 
price uncertainty upon planned outPut . 
to ON, since at this output his sub-
jectively certain marginal cost is equal 
to his subjectively certain price. 
Then suppose that the most probable 
price continues to be OP but other 
prices are considered possible. If dis-
tribution A (zero skewness) repre-
sents the range of expected prices, the 
producer will discount his most prob-
able price and plan for a smaller 
quantity of output such as .0B.With 
range and most probable price constant 
but with a negatively skewed distri· 
bution represented . by B, the most 
probable price would tend to be dis-
counted further with a resulting 
planned output OD, smaller than OB. 
On the other hand, suppose there 
is positive skewness as in distribution 
C. In this case the discounting would 
be less than with either distribution 
A or B. Consequently, planned output 
OC would be higher than OB and OD. 
FORMULATION OF PRICE 
EXPECTATIONS 
Many models involving various de-
grees of complexity might be employed 
by farmers in formulating their price 
expectations." No attempt was made 
in this study to test alternative ex-
pectation models by a systematic 
analysis of the procedures farmers 
actually used in arriving at their ex-
pectations. While forecasting methods 
are an important aspect of production 
planning under conditions of uncer-
tainty, such an attempt would have 
constituted a major research effort in 
itself. 
Nevertheless, during the interviews 
certain impressions were gained about 
how farmers formulate expectations. 
While these do not provide a basis 
for testing alternative models, they 
8 See for example the modelS outlined by 
Gerhard Tlntner in A contribution to 
the non-static theory of chOice, Quarter-
ly Jour. Econ., Vol. LVI and In A con-
tribution to the non-static theory of pro-
duction, Studies in Mathematical Eco-
nomics and Econometrics, University 
of Chicago Press, 1941. See also T. \V. 
Schultz and O. H. Brownlee, Two trials 
to determine expectation models applic-
able to agriculture, Quarterly Jour. 
Econ., LVI, (1941-42); and D. Gale John-
son, Forward prices for agriculture, the 
University of Chicago Press, 1947. 
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may be helpful in suggesting relevant 
hypotheses. 
It became apparent at an early stage 
in the field work that no single pro-
cedure was employed by all farmers. 
Moreover, it was evident that the same 
farmer used more than one procedure, 
depending upon the information he 
possessed and the degree of c·onfidence 
he attached to it. For example, in 
December 1947 some producers seemed 
to be using a simple "parallel" model 
for their long-range forecasts. It im-
plied that prices following World War 
II would decline· as they did after 
World War I. Simultaneously, many 
of the same farmers were using a 
model that gave explicit recognition 
to the supply of corn as a price-making 
variable in their 1948 forecasts. 
For their annual forecasts for 1948 
and 1949, the majority of. farmers were 
not using simple mechanical models 
such as the projection of the current 
price or· recent price trend into the 
next year, but were attempting to 
analyze and predict the more complex 
price-making forces operating in the 
economy. It was a rather common 
procedure for farmers to start the 
process of formulating an expected 
price with the current price. Practi-
cally all farmers knew the current 
prices at local markets for the im-
portant prodUcts of the area. The cur-
rent price then would be adjusted for 
the expected effects of known or antici-
pated changes in what were believed 
to be important supply and demand 
forces. Where farmers believed they 
possessed very little or very uncertain 
information about supply and demand 
forces, they seemed to attach greater 
weight to projections of either the 
current price or the recent price trend, 
if a trend was apparent. 
Farmers recognized that some prices 
for a product at a future date were 
more likely than other prices. While 
some were puzzled as to whether their 
most probable price for, say, corn was 
$1.50 or $1.45, most farmers readily 
distinguished between prices involving 
large differences. However, the idea 
of a distribution of possible prices 
seemed to be only crudely visualized 
by most farmers. Many producers used 
the concept of a distribution of dis-
tributions. They imagined an oc-
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TABLE 1. COMPARISON BETWEEN THE MEANS OF THE MOST PROBABLE 
PRICES EXPECTED BY F AR:\1ERS AND CURRENT PRICES FOR SELECTED 
PRODUCTS, DECEMBER i947 AND DECEMBER 1948 SURVEYS 
Products Date' 
December 1947 survey I December 1948 survey 
Current I :\lost orobable Current I :\lost nrobable 
price" price for 1948 price"" price for 1949 
Corn 
Oats 
Soybeans 
Eggs 
Dec. 
Aug. 
Nov. 
~Iay 
July 
Oct. 
Dec. 
June 
$ 2.60 I $ 1.51 I $ 1.19 I $ 1.07 
1.30 .93 I .74 I .62 
3.60 2.71 I 2.42 I 2.08 
Grain·fed cattle 
Feeder calves 
Hogs 
.4~ I .35 I .41 .33 
29.60 I 30.54 I 29.65 27.58 
Butterfat 
23.50 I 20.47 I 24.55! 20.91 
24.~0 I 22.25 I 20.70 17.12 
.92 I .72 .67 .59 
• Month for which the price forecast was made . 
.. Current prices refer to the prices existing at approximately survey time. See foot-
note 11 for the source of current prices. 
currence such as war or depression 
and the rough probabilities of prices 
under the most HI, ely general outcome. 
They did not, of course, resort to great 
sophistication and first set down the 
probability of major price settings 
(war or depression) and then set 
down the probability of each price 
under each general outcome. Neither 
do farmers go through any formal 
process of compounding probabilities. 
Yet, the general concept of a distribu-
tion of specific price distributions ap-
pears to be recognized in these simple 
processes. 
Some farmers seemed to use a pro-
cedure involving two steps: (1) Esti-
mating the most likely general price 
environment such as war or depression, 
and the most probable price under such 
conditions, and (2) estimating other 
extreme general outcomes and the 
most likely price under each. This 
process gives a most probable price 
under both the most likely general 
price environment and the extreme 
outcomes. 
ANNUAL PRICE EXPECTATIONS 
In December 1947 and 1948 farmers 
were asked what prices they considered 
most probable dUring specific months 
of the following year. The means of 
these prices and the prices current 
during the survey month are pre-
sented in table 1. 
At the time of these surveys the vast 
majority of farmers were pessimistic 
about the price outlook for farm prod-
ucts." The belief was widespread that 
the inflationary forces which had been 
dominating agricultural markets for 
several years were rapidly spending 
themselves. Most producers were anti-
cipating a gradual decline in economic 
activity. Falling prices were expected 
for corn, oats, soybeans, eggs, feeder 
calves, hogs and butterfat. 
While the general farm price level 
was expected to decrease between De-
cember 1947 and 1948, statistically 
significant differences existed among 
products and farmers (table 2.)10 The 
price of corn was expected to fall 
about 42 percent, whereas little change 
(3 percent increase) was anticipated in 
the price of grain-fed cattle. The large 
decrease expected in the price of corn 
was associated with an anticipated 
larger crop. Adverse weather in 1947 
reduced production and raised the De-
cember price to an unusually high 
level. Most farmers based their 1948 
price expectation on the assumption 
that average growing conditions would 
prevail. Price expectations for other 
crops also were influenced by this 
factor. It partly explains why a ma-
"See table 13 for farmers' long-range 
price forecasts. 
10 In making tests of Significance the con-
ditions underlying the models are sel-
dom fully satiSfied. In this case the 
variances for different products exhibit-
ed substantial variation (table 3). How-
ever, since the value of F for products 
was so large (170.8), there is reason to 
believe that the dirterences among varl. 
ances were not large enough to destroy 
the validity of the test. 
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TABLE 2. ANALYSIS OF 'VARIANCE OF EXPECTED PRICE CHANGES, 
DECEMBER 1947 SURVEY.· 
Source of variation 
Farmers 
Products 
Dlscrepance 
Total 
FFarmers = 3.62 
F.Ol = 1.35 
Degrees of freedom 
178 
4 
712 
894 
Sum of square 
104,653 
110,514 
115.398 
330,565 
FProducts = 170.8 
F.01 = 3.35 
:\Iean square 
588 
27.628 
162 
* Products Included corn, hogs, soybeans, oats and calves. 
jority of producers were looking for 
a decline in grain prices relative to 
meat animal· prices. Although the 
basis for the anticipated changes in 
grain-fed cattle prices is not entirely 
clear, many farmers were looking for 
some reduction in marketings since 
they expected the short corn crop of 
1947 to decrease the number of cattle 
on feed. 
Producers were in closer agreement 
on their forecasts of price changes for 
some products. The data in table 3 
supports this conclusion. It shows 
the distributions of the expected price 
to the current price ratios for the 
forecasts made December 1947. The 
variance of each distribution Is taken 
as a measure of the degree of inter-
farmer agreement. Farmers agreed 
most on the price· change for feeder 
calves (varlance-174), and least on the 
price change for hogs (variance-330). 
On the other hand, farmers agreed 
about equally on the changes for corn 
(variance-223) and soybeans (variance-
226). 
The price changes forecast for 
1949 exhibited less inter-product vari-
ation than those of the preceding year. 
In December 1948 the average price 
changes anticipated for seven prodUcts 
ranged between 80 and 93 percent of 
the current price. In contrast, farmers 
in the previous year were forecasting 
prices for five of the' seven products 
which were less than 80 percent of the 
current level. The inter-product vari-
ation for 1949 Is probably more typical 
of periods when weather conditions in 
the preceding year have been average. 
On the other hand, the 1948 variation 
is more typical of periods following 
years of abnormal weather when crop 
prices have shown the effects of large 
changes in marli:et sllpplies. 
TABLE 3. DISTRIBUTION OF RATIOS OF EXPECTED PRICE TO CURRENT 
PRICE FOR SELECTED PRODUCTS, DECElIBER 1947 SURVEY.· 
Expected price Relative frequenc)" as a percent 
of current 
price Corn Hogs Oats Soybean>' Calves 
30 - 49 32.0 0.6 4.5 2.6 
60 - 69 46.1 10.7 50.5 38.9 8.0 
70 - 89 17.4 38.4 H.B 36.8 60.7 
90 - 109 3.9 39.0 5.1 17.8 27.6 
110 - 129 0.6 8.5 4.5 3.9 3.1 
130 -149 2.8 0.0 0.0 
150 -169 0.6 0.6 
100.0 ----- --ioo.o 100.0 100.0 Total 100.0 
Number 
163 answering 178 177 178 152 
Mean 58.8 89.4 70.8 76.9 i 86.9 Variance 233 330 292 226 174 
• Current prices as of "urvey date, December 1941; expected prices for the following 
period,,: corn, December 1948; hogs, December 1948; oats, August 1948; soybeans. 
November 1948; and calves, October 1948. Ratios are giVen in percentage form. 
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TABLE 4. COMPARISON BETWEEN THE )rEANS OF THE MOST PROBABLE 
PRICES EXPECTED BY FARMERS AND REALIZED PRICES FOR SELECTED 
PRODUCTS, DECEMBER 1947 A""D DECEMBER 1948 SURVEYS. 
December 1947 survey \ December 1948 survey 
Products Date' )Iost probable I Realized )IoRt probable I Realized 
price for 1948 price**' price for 1949 price'· 
Corn Dec. $ 1.51 I $ 1.19 I $ 1.07 $ 1.08 Oats .54 Aug. .93 .66 .61 Soybeans ""ov. 2.71 2.32 2.08 2.03 Eggs )Iav .35 .36 .33 .39 
Grain·fed cattle July 
I 
30.54 35.19 
I 
27.58 25.14 
Feeder calves Oct. 20.47 25.80 20.91 22.57 Hogs Dec. 22.26 
Butterfat 
20.70 17.12 14.70 
June .72 .85 .59 .60 
• Month for which price forecast was made . 
. . See footnote 11 for the source of realized prices. 
ERRORS IN ANNUAL EXPECTATIONS 
Insofar as farmers make prodUction 
plans on the basis of their price ex-
pectations, the failure of these prices 
to materialize will prevent ex post 
profits from being maximized. 
Equally important, errors in price 
expectations make agriculture less 
efficient. If farmers overestimate 
prices of some prodUcts and under-
estimate others-and expand and 
contract production accordingly-mar-
ginal rates of substitution between 
these products will not be equal to 
corresponding marginal rates in con-
sumption. This results in an in-
efficient pattern of prodUction. 
In addition, inter-farmer variation in 
errors of expectation can result in 
inefficient distribution of production. 
This could happen if some farmers 
overestimate the price of a product 
while others underestimate it. Farmers 
who overestimate will expand pro-
duction too much, and vice versa. As 
a consequence, marginal costs of pro-
duction will not be the same on all 
farms. Thus the same volume. of out-
put could be produced at less oppor-
tunity cost. 
What ",as the nature of the errors 
in the price expectations of farmers 
in Southern Iowa? In 1948 there were 
substantial differences (10 percent or 
more of the realized price) between 
the means of the expected and realized 
prices for corn, oats, soybeans, grain-
fed cattle, feeder calves and butterfat 
(table 4),.1l The average forecasts 
overestimated the prices of corn, sOY-
beans, oats and feeder calves and 
underestimated the prices of butterfat 
11 Aside from the exceptions to be noted. 
the realized and current prices are 
prices received by farmers at local mar-
kets as of the 15th of the month in the 
South Central and Southeastern crop re-
porting districts collected by the Iowa 
Crop and Livestock Reporting Service, 
Des )Ioines, Iowa. )lr. S. J. Gilbert, 
agricultural statistician in charge of the 
Iowa Crop and Livestock Reporting 
SerVice, has warned that the district 
price data are not processed, adjusted, 
or in any way brought to a level for the 
district comparable with the official 
state figures and that the samples were 
not designed to collect information for 
very specifiC use at less than the state 
level. A check on the representativeness 
of the means of the prices reported for 
the two crop reporting districts used in 
this study is provided by information 
on prices received by farmers in the 
sample obtained in the December 1948 
survey. With two exceptions, the price 
of cattle and the price of calves, the 
a verage of the prices reported received 
or paid by local buyers in this survey 
corresponded very closely with the 
means of the prices for the two crop 
reporting districts collected by the Iowa 
Crop Heporting service. Since )lr. Gil-
bert was reluctant to make these data 
available because of their limitations, 
the authors accept responsibility for any 
'orror that might arise from their use 
in this study. In the case of grain-fed 
cattle, that price was based upon the 
Chicago price for good grade finished 
cattle adjusted for transportation costs. 
The price of feeder calves was based on 
the Omaha price of ,,"ood grade feeder 
cattIe adjusted for transportation costs. 
Despite the effort that was made to ob-
tain realized prices ·that were represen-
tative of prices actually received by 
farmers during the months for which 
the forecasts Were made, it is well to 
keep in mind that the prices used are 
estimates of realized prices and conse-
quently are subject to error. 
851 
and finished cattle. The price of 
feeder calves was overestimated by 
about 18 percent, while the price of 
finished cattle was underestimated by 
nearly 13 percent. The largest dif-
fer,ence (41 percent) occurred in the 
case of oats. 
However, errors in the average ex-
pected prices' for 1949 were com-
paratively small. Only with respect 
to hogs, eggs and oats did the average 
expected price differ from the realized 
price by more than 10 percent. Dif-
ferences for corn, soybeans and butter-
fat were insignificant. If a farmer 
had planned his operations on the basis 
of the average expected prices, he conld 
have come closer to the profit maxi-
mizing pattern of production in 1949 
than in 1948. 
But average 'differences don't tell 
much about the forecasting errors' of 
individual farmers. Individual fore-
casts fall both above and below the 
realized price. In the process of aver-
aging, negative and positive errors 
tend to cancel out. For example, the 
average forecast for corn in 1949 dif-
fered from the realized price by about 
1 percent. Yet, only 52 percent of the 
individual forecasts fell within pIns 
or minus 10 percent of the realized 
price. This meant that 48 percent of 
the farmers had missed the price by 
more than 10 percent. 
Tables 5 and 6 indicate more clearly 
the nature of the expectational errors. 
In table 5 the errors are expressed as 
deviations between the expected price 
and the realized price. Positive de-
viations, negative deviations and de-
viations without regard to sign are 
classified separately. In table 6 ex-
pected prices are expressed as ratios 
of realized prices. The distribution of 
these ratios provides a picture of vari-
ation among both farmers and prod-
ucts. 
The average absolute error~ (de-
viations disregarding signs) In the 
individual forecasts for 1948 ranged 
from 23 percent of the realized price 
for hogs to 44 percent for oats. For 
1949 the errors varied from 33 per-
cent for soybeans to 21 percent in the 
case of corn. 
About 80 percent of the forecasts 
for corn for 1948 had errors greater 
than plus or minus 10 percent of the 
realized price. The figure for hogs 
was 70 percent; for soybeans, 76 per-
cent; for oats, 92 percent; and for 
butterfat, 74 percent. While the errors 
in individual forecasts for 1949 were 
also large, in most instances they were 
substantially smaller than for 1948. 
It is apparent from table 6 that vari-
ation among farmers was very great. 
In 1948, for example, 35 percent of the 
farmers underestimated the price of 
eggs by more than 10 percent while 
42 percent overestimated by this 
amount. If producers were to act on 
the basis of such forecasts, it is clear 
that on some farms the marginal 
opportunity cost of producing eggs 
would tend to exceed the realized price 
whereas the reverse would be true on 
other farms. Profits would be lower 
in both cases. Furthermore, since 
relative marginal costs on different 
farms would tend to be unequal, tne 
degree of specialization among pro· 
ducers would not be optimum. If all 
farmers were to plan their operations 
on the basis of the same price, the cost 
of producing a given output of eggs-
measured by the quantity of alternative 
products sacrificed-would be smaller 
since marginal costs would tend to be 
the same for all producers." Inasmuch 
as variation among farmers for other 
products was also large, the distribu-
tion of output would be distorted if 
they developed production plans ac-
cording to their forecasts. 
1> The principle may be illustrated by an 
example. Suppose the marginal oppor-
tunity cost of the current output of 
eggs on Farm Y is 2 pounds of pork 
and on Farm X is 3 pounds of pork, 
"nd that marginal opportunity cost,,; are 
increasing on both farms. Assume that 
output on Farm X is reduced by a small 
amount and that output on Farm Y is 
increased sufficiently to leave the com-
bined output constant. Since marginal 
costs are different on the two farms, the 
reduction in output on Farm X will reo 
duce costs (pounds of pork sacrificed) 
by more than the increase In output on 
Farm Y will increase costs. The shift 
in the location of production would per-
mit the same total quantity of eggs to 
be produced and it would also permit a 
larger output of pork or other products. 
This reduction in costs would continue 
until marginal costs were the same on 
both farms. 
TABLE 5. ERRORS IN INITIAL PRICE EXPECTATIO""S FOR 1948 AND 1949.' 
Corn Hogs Oats Soybeans Eggs Grain·fed cattle (Forecast (Forecast (Forecast (Forecast (Forecast (Forecast for Dec.) for Dec.) for Aug.) for Nov.) for May) for July) 
1948 ! 1949 194811949 1948 11949. 1948 11949 1948 11949 1948 11949 
I I 
I I I I I Price expected I ! 
greater than I I I I I realized price: I I I Number 146 I 50 90 153 163 1 120 113 1 110 73 21 57 I 88 Average error (~) .44 .17 5.52 2.49 .29 .13 .67 .20 .07 I .02 3.44 5.04 I I I I Price expected 
1 
I I I less than realized I I 
I I 
price: I I I 
Number 39 
1 136 
93 33 23 66 72 ! 76 112 I 165 129 I 98 AYerage error ($) .32 .25 3.78 15.43 .28 .17 1.20 1.33 .10 I .11 12.13 19.66 I I I I 
A bsolute error I 1 I I I (Av. disregard· 
1 
I I I I I 
lng signs) I 
/186 
I I 
Number 185 I 186 186 I 186 186 
1 186 
] 85 185 
1 186 
186 I 186 
Average error ($) .4:1 I .23 4.69 13.77 .29 .15 .95 I .66 .09 .11 9.43 17.23 
I I I I I I Absolu te error as I I I I 
a percent of I I I I I I realized price 36 I 21 23 I 26 44. I 28 41 33 25 28 27 I 29 
.. Forecasts for 1948 were made in December 1947 and forecasts for 1949 were made in December 1948. 
Feeder calves (Forecast 
for Oct.) 
! 
1948 I 1949 
I 
I 
7 , 48 
1.05 2.41 
I 
I 
I 
I 
179 I 138 
8.48 17.82 
I 
I 
186 1186 
8.32 16.55 
I 
I 
I 
32 I 29 
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TAfiLE 6. FREQUE:-.ICY DISTRlfiL'TION OF ERROHS IN PRICE EXPECTATIONS FOR 1948 AND 1949. * 
Corn Hogs Oats So~·beans Eggs Butterfat 
Expected price (Forecast (l"orec-a~t (Forecast (Forecast (Forecast (ForecaRt 
as a percent of for Dec.) for Dec.) for Aug.) for Nov.) for :llay) for June) 
realized price 
/ 
I I I I I 1948 1949 1948 I 1949 19~8 I 1949 1948 1949 1948 I 1949 19,18 I 1949 I I I 
I / 
I I 
/ 
I 
30·49 I I 0.6 I 50·69 1.1 11.2 2.2 0.6 1.9 0.6 I 8.3 I 11.1 8.2 I 6.8 
70-89 12.8 14.7 19.2 1.2 3.4 I 4.1 17.6 I 13.2 26.0 I 71.1 63.0 
/ 
27.4 
I I I I I 
90·109 19.6 I 51.7 30.0 I 40.8 8.4 I 28.5 24.2 I 55.9 23.0 I l3~:5 25.7 I 46.0 
I ! 
I I I I 11 0-129 34.7 21.2 36.8 43.2 3;;.5 I 49.9 35.4 26.6 35.0 I ·1.3 3.1 I 14.9 130-149 10.0 1.2 9.0 12.4 7.8 12.5 5.9 2.2 5.9 I I 4.3 150·169 16.7 2.8 I 1.2 32.1 2.4 12.4 I 0.7 1.2 I I 0.6 
170-189 0.6 I 0.6 6.7 I 0.7 3.3 I 1.4 \ \ / I I I 190-209 0.0 1.1 I 0.6 I I I 
210-229 !l.9 I I 4.4 I I I I 230-249 0.0 . 0.6 I I I / 250-269 0.6 I 1 I I 
Total 100.0 /100.0 100.0· I 100.0 100.0 I 100.0 100.0 I 100.0 100.0 I 100.0 100.0 I 100.0 
1169 
I I 1 
1161 
Number 
178 /1G!) 1136 1162 answering 179 170 177 
-------
153 169 159 
• Forecasts for 1948 were made in December 1947 and forecasts for 1949 were made in December 1948. 
For comparability. error is measured .by the ratio of the expected price to the realized price. 
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FARMER AND PROFESSIONAL 
FORmCASTS 
DUring the study four professional 
analysts in close touch with price out-
look gave forecasts for the same prod-
ucts, periods and general location as 
farmers. We must remember, though, 
that these forecasts are not necessarily 
typical of the forecasts of analysts in 
general, and that they cover just one 
year with only 15 observations (i.e., 
mean forecast of each product). How-
ever, it's interesting to compare their 
forecasts with those of Southern Iowa 
farmers. 
Table 7 gives a comparison of the 
mean forecasts of the two groups. In 
order to mal,e forecasts for different 
products comparable, the mean fore-
casts were converted into percentages 
of the realized price. The errors were 
measured by the differences between 
the percentage ratio and 100. 
The average error for the 15 farmer 
forecasts was 9.3 percentage points 
compared to 8.2 for the analysts. Hpw-
ever, the mean difference between the 
paired errors of the average forecasts 
made by the analysts and of those 
made by farmers did not differ signifi-
cantly from zero.u During this period, 
an individual farmer would have done 
nearly as well by basing his farm plans 
on average farmer forecasts as on the 
forecasts of the analysts. 
Of course, many individual farmers 
had larger forecasting errors than the 
analysts. There is a tendency for in-
dividual errors to cancel out in the 
averages shown in table 7_ So even 
though an average forecast corresponds 
to the realized price there still could 
.be a large amount of inefficient pro-
duction. 
It is interesting to note that the 
,. The t value for the mean difference be-
tween the paired errors of· the fore-
casts of the two groups was 0.59 com-
pared to tabular value of 2.14 with 14 
degrees of freedom. Variation in the 
individual forecasts of the four analysts 
was comparatively small. Coefficients 
of varIation for the December 1948 
forecasts were as follows: Calves, 7.7 
percent; grain-fed cattle. 8.2 percent; 
corn, 12.8 percent; soybeans, 9.5 per-
cent; and hogs, 10.3 percent. 
errors in the mean forecasts of the 
analysts and the' farmers run roughly 
parallel." When the analysts made 
large errors, so did the farmers; and 
the same held true when the errors 
were small. Evidently many of the 
same factors accounting for the errors 
in forecasting were the same for both 
analyst and farmer. 
SUBJECTIVE PRICE UNCERTAINTY 
A farmer's willingness to act on his 
price forecasts depends partIy on how 
much confidence he places in them. 
If his past judgments have been ac-
curate, he is more likely to follow 
them than if he has had unsuccessful 
forecasts. In the absence of subjective 
uncertainty, price expectations would 
be single-valued and the farmer would 
ha:ve complete confidence in his fore-
casts. 
It was noted earlier, however, that 
the farmer's price expectations rarely 
have a single value. While a farmer 
considers one price as most probable, 
he knows that other prices-higher and 
lower-are also possible. He may even 
think that his most probable price has 
a very small chance of being realized, 
despite the fact that he thinks its 
chances are greater than any other 
price. Moreover, his actions depend 
on what he thinks the chances are for 
a price higher or lower than his most 
probable price. These and related con-
siderations influence his willingness 
to plan his production in line with his 
expectations. 
Farm estimates of the range of ex-
pected prices were made in order to 
learn how much uncertainty farmers 
have about their price expectations. In 
essence, farmers were asked to give 
the range of prices within which the 
chances were 98 out of 100 that the 
actual price would fall. Separate ques-
tions were put to the farmer in obtain-
U The relationship between the 15 prod-
duct ratios for farmers and those for 
the analysts gave a correlation co-
efficient of 0.88 and a regression co-
efficient of 0.72. Both values differed 
significantly from zero with 13 de-
grees of freedom. 
TABI.E 7. COMPARIRON OI<' 'l'HE MEAN PRICE EXl'EC~rATIONS OF FARMERS AND ANALYSTS. * 
Date for which MOHt nrobable :'lost probable Expected price as a percent Date of price price Realized of realized price ** 
forecast foreeaHt wa,; expected by expected by price 
made farmers analyst,; Farmers Analysts 
, 
Corn June 1948 Dec. 1948 $ 1.52 $ 1.38 $ 1.19 128 i16 
Dee. 1948 Dec. 1949 1.07 1.15 1.06 101 109 
June 1949 Dec. 1949 .94 .97 1.06 89 92 
Hogs .Tune 1948 Dec. 1948 20.19 22.00 20.30 99 108 
Dec. 1948 Dec. 1949 17.12 16.38 14.70 117 III 
.June 1949 Dec. 1949 15.85 15.00 14.70 108 102 
Grain·fed cattle June 1948 July 1948 32.92 32.75 35.19 94 93 
D<'c. 1948 July 1949 27.57 28.00 25.14 109 111 
June 1949 July 1949 25.82 24.83 25.14 103 99 
Feeder cnlves .Tune 1948 Oct. 1948 24.71 23.50 25.46 97 92 
Dec. 1948 Oct. 1949 20.91 22.25 22.57 93 99 
June 1949 Oct. 1949 20.64 20.00 22.57 92 89 
Soybeans June 1948 Nov. 1948 3.04 2.94 2.32 131 127 
Dec. 1948 Nov. 1949 2.08 2.00 1.99 104 100 
June 1949 Nov. 1949 1.94 2.04 1.99 97 103 
-- -- _. - -
• Analysts consisted of four professional peO]l]e in close touch with the farm price outlook . 
• * Errors without regard to signs. . 
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TABLE 8. MEAN RANGES AND RATIOS OF EXPECTED PRICES FOR CORN 
AND HOGS, DECEMBER SURVEYS, 1947 AND 1948. 
Corn 
Forecast for December 
Hogs 
Forecast for December 
I I 
1948 I 1949 1948 I 1949 
I I 
I I Lowest expected price" $1.08 $ .77 $16.82 I $13.50 Most probable price 1.51 I 1.07 22.26 I 17.12 
Highest expected price" 2.34 I 1.58 28.02 I 23.38 Range 1.26 I .81 11.20 I 9.88 Ratio (Range/lIPP) .83 .76 .60 I .58 
• Based on a 1 in 100 chance that the realized price would be lower (or higher). 
ing the upper and lower llmits of the 
range.'" 
The vast majority of producers were 
able to specify the particular prices 
serving as limits. However, some un-
doubtedly expressed upper and lower 
limits at the 99 percent level of proba-
bility as the most probable prices of 
the over-all distributions. And others 
selected the least likely of the over-all 
outcomes and then selected the highest 
and lowest possible prices under each. 
For 'example, some may have selected 
war and depression as the extreme out· 
comes and then selected the most prob· 
able price under each as the limits of 
their range. Others may have selected 
war inflation and depression as the 
things least llkely to happen, and then 
selected the highest and lowest prices 
under each for their limits. Detailed 
information was obtained only for 
corn and hogs, the two principal 
products of the area. 
RANGE OF EXPECTED PRICES 
The range of expected prices derived 
from these data can be used as a 
measure of the degree of subjective 
uncertainty. The greater the range 
-other things equal-the greater the 
degree of uncertainty. When expressed 
as a ratio of the most probable price, 
15 The specific questions were as tollows: 
"What is the lowest price for (prod-
uct) below which you think the chances 
are lout of 100 that the actual price 
In (date) might fall?" "What Is the 
highest price for (product) above which 
YOU think the chances are lout ot 100 
that the actual "rice in (date) might 
fall 1" 'Vhile producers seldom used the 
term "probability," most of them recog· 
nized the concept as "so many chances 
,out of 100." 
the degree of uncertainty for different 
products and for periods may be com· 
pared. Estimates.of the population 
means for the December surveys of 
1947 and 1948 are shown in table 8. 
Compared to the situation where 
prices are held with subjective cer· 
tainty (zero range), it is evident that 
the degree of subjective uncertainty 
surrounding farmers' corn and hog 
price expectations was large enough 
to be significant from the standpoint of 
production planning. The mean ratio 
in percentage form for corn was 83 
percent in 1948 and 76 percent in 
19,49. The comparable figures for hogs 
were 50 and 58 percent. It appears 
that farmers were more confident 
about their expectations for hogs than 
for corn.to 
The narrowing or widening of the 
range of expected prices between years 
is a measure of the change in uncer-
tainty over time. Data given in table 
9 support the conclusion that the de-
gree of uncertainty for corn declined 
between December 1947 and December 
1948. Of the total of 163 farmers es-
timating the range of expected prices, 
105 had a lower range for their De· 
cember 1948 forecasts than for those 
of 1947. The average range of prices 
narrowed by $1.12 per bushel. The re-
maining '58 farmers showed less con-
fidence in their estimates for 1949. 
The range for this group widened by 
an average of 68 cents per bushel. 
Ninety of the 159 farmers who esti-
mated the price range for hogs in both 
,. An analysis of, variance ot the ratios 
for the December and .June surveys 
reported in table 18 suggests that dif-
ferences as small as 5 percentage points 
are statistically significant. 
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TABLE~. CHANGES IN PRICE UNCERTAIXTY BETWEEN YEARS 1948 
AND 1949. 
1948 first range minus 1949 first range 
Grea tel' certainty Less certainty Absolute change of 1949 price than of 1949 price than In price range' of 1948 price of 1948 price 
Commodity :Month Extent Extent 
Number by which Number by which Number Change 
answer- price ans\ver- price answer· in price 
ing range Ing range ing range was was 
narrowed widened 
Corn Dec. 105 1.12 
Hogs Dec. 90 7.73 
• Average dlsregardmg signs. 
years showed greater confidence in 
their 1949 prediction by narrowing the 
range $7.73 per hundredweight. The 
other 69 farmers-having less con· 
fidence-widened their range by an 
average of $7.51 per hundredweight. 
The majority of farmers in this 
study had more confidence in their 
194·8 forecasts than in their 1947 fore-
casts for corn and hogs. The fact 
that corn price supports became ef-
fective in the fall of 1948 was partly 
responsible for the reduction in sub· 
jective uncertainty. At the time of 
the December 1948 survey, 94 percent 
of the farmers knew the local loan 
rate for 1948 corn. About 90 percent 
of the group planned to seal corn-
an average of 446 bushels. Also, duro 
58 .68 163 1.03 
69 7.51 159 7.54 
ing the course of the interview, some 
farmers specifically mentioned the price 
effects of the loan program. 
A clue to inter·farmer variation in 
the degree of subjective uncertainty 
(table 10) is provided by the dis· 
tributions of the ranges of expected 
prices given by individual farmers. 
While these distributions tend to be 
sl{ewed toward the lower ranges, some 
farmers viewed their expectations with 
much greater confidence than others. 
For example, about 10 percent of the 
group indicated an expected price 
range for hogs of less than $4.00 per 
hundredweight in December 1948. Ap· 
proximately the same proportion gave 
ranges exceeding $16.00. 
Even though farmers in each group 
TABLE 10. DISTRIBUTIONS OF THE RANGES FOR CORN AND HOGS, 
DECE~1BER SURVEYS. 1947 AND 1948. 
Corn Hogs 
Forecast for Forecast for 
December December 
Range (Relative Range (Relative (Dollars) frequency) (Dollars) frequency} 
1948 I 1949 1948 I 1949 I 
I I O· .49 6.3 18.5 o· 3.99 15.6 I 9.5 .50· .99 33.6 42.2 4.00· 7.99 22.5 28.0 
1.00·1.49 18.6 
I 
21.4 8.00 ·11.99 38.2 I 29.1 
1.50·1.99 19.3 11.9 12.00 - 15.99 13.9 I 22.6 
2.00·2.49 14.2 3.6 16.00· 19.99 5.8 I 4.8 2.50·2.99 2.3 0.6 20.00·23.99 1.7 4.8 
3.00·3.49 3.4 I 1.8 24.00·27.99 0.6 I 1.2 3.50·4.00 2.3 28.00·31.99 1.7 I 
Total 100.0 I 100.0 100.0 I 100.0 
Number I I responding 176 168 I 174 I 169 
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forecast the same most probable prices, 
the difference in the degree of sub· 
jective uncertainty could cause a dif· 
ference in production response. Other 
things being equal. farmers with the 
higher degree of uncertainty will tend 
to discount their most probable price 
more. 
S){EWXESS IX Exp.:cn:1l PRICES 
If -it is assumed that the most prob· 
able price represents the mode, the 
distribution of probabilities for ex-
pected prices is given by the algebraic 
sum of the highest expected price and 
the lowest expected price minus twice 
the most probable price. This is zero in 
the absence of skewness, positive when 
the distribution is skewed to the right, 
and negative when the distribution is 
skewed to the left. In a "normal" 
distribution, the probabilities of a price 
higher than the most probable price 
are the same as" those for a lower 
price. 
A general picture of the distribution 
of price probabilities is shown in table 
8. The algebraic sum of differences 
for corn in the December 1947 sur-
vey shows that expected prices were 
skewed to the right. The difference 
between the most probable price and 
lowest expected price was 43 cents 
per bushel. And the difference be· 
tween the highest expected price and 
the most probable price amounted to 
83 cents per bushel. The estimates 
made _ by farmers in December 1948 
were also skewed to the right. al-
though not as much. Support prices 
under government programs caused 
a "floor" to be placed under most esti-
mates of the lowest expected price. 
With respect to hogs. the distribution 
of the probabilities of expected prices 
for 1948 is more nearly "normal"-
with only a slight skewness to the 
right. On the other hand, the distri-
bution for 1949 exhibits much greater 
positive skewness. The differences 
were $3.62 and $6.26 per hundred-
weight, for the lowest and highest 
prices, respectively. 
The distributions of skewness for in-
dividual farmers in table 11 give some 
indication of inter·farmer variation. 
Deflnite uniformity patterns for both 
corn and hogs reflect the similarity in 
judgments of farmers. However. some 
producers had rather unusual distri-
butions of expected prices. For ex· 
ample. in 1948 over 8 percent of the 
farmers had hog price distributions 
negatively skewed by more than $5. 
At the other extreme, nearly 11 per-
cent of the farmers had distributions 
positively skewed br more than $7. 
As pointed out earlier, farmers with 
positively skewed distributions will dis-
count their most probable price more 
-other things being equal-than farm-
TABLE 11. DISTRIBUTIONS OF INDICES OF SKEWNESS FOR CORN AND 
HOGS, DECEMBER SURVEY, 1947.· 
Corn H"ogs 
Index of Relative Index of Relative skewness frequency skewness frequency (dollars) (dollars) 
-1.06 and over 2.2 -13.1 and over 2.5 
-1.05 - -.46 3.9 -13.0 - -9.1 4.2 
-.46· +.14 41.1 -9.0· -5.1 1.6 
+.15· +.74 24.4 -5.0 - -1.1 28.0 
+.75·+1.34 17,2 -1.0 - +2.9 27.1 
+1.35 - +1.94 6.1 +3.0 - +6.9 25.5 
+1.95 - +2.54 
I 
4.5 +7.0 ·+10.9 8.4 
+2.55 and over 0.5 +11.0 and over 2.5 
Total 100.0 100.0 
• Skewness IS measured by the dIfference between the highest expected price mmus 
the most probable price and the most probable prIce minus the lowest expected 
price. In the absence of skewness this meaSure Is zero; when the distribution Is 
skewed to the left this measure Is negative; and when the distribution Is skewed to 
the right this measure i" positive. 
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TABLE 12. STATISTICS RELATI~G '1'0 THE CO~SISTENCY OF ERRORS 
OF EXPECTATIO~S. 
RegresRion Value of t for Correlation Error regression coefficient 
coefficient coefficient 
Year-to-year errors 
for corn .024 .231 .017 
Product to product 
errors (corn and 
hogs) .238' S.275 .520" 
• Significant at the 1 percent level of probability . 
•• Significant at the 5 percent level of probahility. 
ers with negatively sl{ewed distribu-
tions. Price support guarantees which 
produce positive skewness in the dis-
tributions would therefore tend to 
lower the rate of discount and en-
courage a larger volume of production. 
CO~SISTE:\,CY OF ERRORS OF 
EXPEC'l.'ATIONS 
Do some farmers consistently make 
more accurate forecasts than others? 
More specifically, are the errors in ex-
pectations for the same product over 
time consistently' small for some farm· 
ers and large foi' others? And do 
farmers who have large (or smaJl) 
errors for corn also have large (or 
smaJl) errors for hogs? . 
To shed some light on these ques-
tions, regression and correlation co-
efficients have been computed relating 
(1) the size of a farmer's forecasting 
error for corn in 1948 to that in 1949, 
and (2) the size of a farmer's fore· 
casting error for corn to that for hog's 
for the same year. The coefficients are 
presented in table 12. . 
The forecasting errors for individual 
farmers for corn" were not significantly 
associated in the t\\'o years. Neither 
the regression nor the correlation co· 
efficient was significant at an accept-
able level of probability. 
In other words, individual farmers 
did not have consistent forecasting 
errors for a specific product. It was, 
of course, possible to find individuals 
\"ho had extremely small or large 
errors in both years. It is also possible 
and even likely that better informed 
farmers are highly consistent in the 
size of their forecasting errors. " 
However, on the basis ot two years' 
observations, a similar statement can· 
not be applied to the entire sample, 
since a farmer with a small error one 
year was just as likel~' to have a large 
error the next. It is quite possible 
that-aside from' a small group of out-
standing farmers-the great majority 
of prodUcers do not mal,e consistently 
accurate expectations from one year to 
the next. Additional data are needed 
to further test this possibility. 
In contrast, a significant degree of 
consistency was found to exist· be· 
tween products for the same farmer 
in the same year. Farmers who had 
the smallest forecasting errors for corn 
also tended to have the smallest errors 
for hogs. This relationship for errors 
between products suggests that if 
farmers are wrong for one product 
they also will be wrong for other 
products. 
If this is generally true, it would 
mean that product diversification will 
not produce an "averaging out" effect 
as far as expectations are concerned. 
If a farmer makes mistakes in one 
direction he will also make them in 
other directions. This will encourage 
overproduction of all products on some 
farms and 'underproduction on other 
farms making for an over·all in-
efficient distribution of output. 
LONG-RANGE PRICE 
EXPECTATIONS 
While producers find it exceedingly 
difficult to accurately predict short-
run changes in farm prices, the formu-
lation of accurate long-run expecta-
tions presents an even bigger problem. 
Yet, many of the most important de-
cisions rest heavily on judgments made 
about the course of prices over a 
period of years, 
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TABLE 13. PRICE TRENDS EXPECTED FOR "ALL" FAR~[ PRODUCTS, CORN, 
HOGS AND BUTTERFAT AS OF DECEMBER 1947 AND 
REALIZED PRICES THROUGH 1951. 
I 
HAll" farm Corn Hogs Butterfat' 
Item nroductfl* (Dec.) (Dec.) ( June) (1947 = 100) (dollars) (dollars) (dollars) 
Current prices Dec. 1947 100 2.60 24.90 .92 
Price expected for 1948 92 1.51 22.25 .72 
Realized price for 1948 89 1.20 20.70 .85 
Price expected for 1949 78 1.23 17.60 .63 
Realized price for 1949 77 1.08 14.70 .60 
Price expected for 1950 68 1.08 14.69 .57 
Realized price for 1950 95 1.43 14.50 .61 
Price expected for 1951 
- .96 13.16 .51 Realized price for 1951 
-
1.63 17.30 .79 
Price expected for 1955 53 .84 11.44 .46 
• Realized prices for "all" farm products are the index numbers of prices received 
by Iowa farmers as a whole prepared by the Iowa Crop and Livestock Reporting 
Service. The index numbers were converted to a December 1947 base. 
Some clue to the long-run expec-
tations of farmers in Southern Iowa 
at the time of the initial survey in De-
cember 1947 is giVen by the data in 
table 13. These data represent the 
means of the most probable values 
expected by individual producers for 
corn, hogs, butterfat, and "aU" farm 
products over a period of eight years. 
In general, farmers were basing their 
longe-range forecasts on the expec-
tation that a gradual decline in econo-
mic activity would occur after 1947. 
Farm prices were expected to turn' 
down in 1948 and to continue to fall 
until at least 1955. The average of 
the forecasts for prices in 1955 was 
about 50 percent of the December 1947 
level. 
With the exception of a much larger 
decline expected for corn between 1947 
and 1948, discussed earlier, the down-
ward trends expected for corn, hogs 
and butterfat were qilite similar. Ap-
parently farmers were not anticipating 
any substantial shifts in relative prices 
over the period as a whole. The ex-
pected corn-hog ratio showed no defi-
nite trend. Evidently most producers 
anticipated a fairly favorable feeding 
ratio. 
Sufficient time has elapsed since De-
cember 1947 to permit an over-all com-
parison between some of the forecasts 
and realized prices. The averages of 
the forecasts made by individual pro-
duce"rs of the farm price level in 1948 
and 1949 were very close to the 
realized levels (table 13). It is clear 
that farmers failed to foresee the out-
brealc of war in Korea and the ac-
companying rise in prices. As a con-
sequence, the errors in expectations 
for 1950 and 1951 were especially 
large. The average expected level of 
farm prices in December 1950 was 
only 7'2 percent of the realized level. 
And the 1951 average forecast for corn 
was only 58 percent of the realized 
price. The comparable figures for hogs 
vi'as 75 percent; butterfat 64 percent. 
Table 14 gives some indication of 
the variation in long-range expecta-
tions among farmers. The data show 
each year's distribution of the most 
probable hog prices. While there is a 
noticeable concentration about the 
mean in every case, it is also apparent 
that farmers were not completely 
agreed on the long-run outlook for 
hogs. 
Moreover, the variation within years 
tends to decrease with the increase 
in the length of the expectational 
period. Farmers were in closer agree-
ment on expectations for 1955 than for 
1948. This might be partly explained 
by the increased weight attached to 
the possibility of a general recession 
in the forecasts for the more distant 
future. While there was widespread 
belief that a recession was in the 
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TABLE 14. DISTRIBUTION OF LONG.RANGE PRICE FORECASTS FOR HOGS 
llADE IN DECElIBER 1947. 
!\fost probable 
expected price ! 
per 100 lbs. 1949 i 
I 
$ 4.0 - 7.9 O. j '70 I 8.0 - 11.9 4.6 12.0 - 15.9 36.0 I 16.0 - 19.9 23.1 I 20.0 - 23.9 25.0 I 
24.0 - 27.9 6.6 I 28.0 - 31.9 4.0 
Total 100.0 I Number 
answering 152 I Average most 
I probable price $I i.21 Realized price 14.70 
making, some farmers seemed to think 
it would come sooner than others. 
In addition, the more immediate 
forecasts were influenced by factors 
which were considered to be of a 
temporary nature or which could be 
better appraised in the near future. 
Producers were not always agreed on 
the price effects of these factors. 
REVISIONS IN PRICE 
EXPECTATIONS 
Price expectations usually undergo 
revision with the passage of time. 
Unforeseen events and new information 
cause the producer to lose confidence 
in his earlier forecasts. As a conse-
quence, he tends to re-appraise his 
price outlook and arrives at a new 
set of estimates which he thinks are 
more in keeping with current infor-
mation. 
It might be expected that the degree 
of uncertainty and the size of the fore-
casting error would decrease with the 
approach of the date for which the 
forecast is made. Because of the con-
tinuities in economic activity, the 
possible variation in the values of 
price-making variables tends to be an 
increasing function of time. More-
over, the amount of available infor-
mation about these variables increases 
as the date for which the forecast 
is made approaches. For these reasons 
a producer would have more confldence 
in his estimate of tomorrow's price 
Relative frequency 
I I 
1950 I 1951 I 1955 I 
1.4% I 2.1% I 11.8% 
16.9 
I 
31.7 I 36.1 43.0 43.7 40.9 21.1 12.1 7.7 
I 
12.0 I 10.7 I 3.5 
4.9 I 0.7 I 0.7 I 
100.0 I 100.0 I 100.0 I 
142 I 140 I 
144 
$14.67 I $13.05 $12.40 14.50 17.30 --
than in his estimate of the price a 
year from tomorrow. For similar 
reasons the accuracy of short-term 
forecasts would be greater than long-
term forecasts. 
On the other hand, it is not difficult 
to imagine situations where the degree 
of subjective uncertainty and the size 
of the forecasting error might be 
greater for estimates over shorter 
periods. For example, congressional 
consideration of a new agricultural 
price policy might temporarily create 
additional uncertainty. If the policy 
change were expected to have im-
portant short-run price effects, the un-
certainty of its approval might reduce 
the degree of confidence which farmers 
attached to their expectations just 
after the announcement that a new 
policy was under consideration. 
Furthermore, new information may 
increase as well as decrease the size 
of the forecasting error. If an earlier 
forecast was in error because of, mis-
interpretation of available information, 
additional information may similarly 
be misinterpreted and serve to in-
crease rather than decrease the error. 
During the course of this study. data 
on .farmers' price expectations were 
obtained at 6-month intervals over a 
period from December 1947 to June 
1949. These data, along with related 
information, indicate the nature of the 
revisions in producers' expectations 
over pel'lods of 6, 12 and 18 months. 
TABLE 1r.. REVISIONS IN 1948 AND 1949 PRICE EXPECTATIONS AFTER AN INTERVAL OF SIX MONTHS. 
I 
1948 
:\Io"t probable Revision Cur-Product I Date' price for 1948 in rent Realized forecast in average price price 
expected change** Dec. '47 June '48 price 
Soybeans ~O\P. $ 2.71 $ 3.04 $ +.33 $ +.34 $ 2.32 
Grain-fed cattle July 30.54 32.92 +2.38 +2.65 35.19 
Fepder calves Oct. 20.47 24.71 +4.24 +3.20 25.80 
Corn Dee. 1.51 1.52 +.01 -.35 1.19 
Hog,; DN'. 22.25 20.19 -2.06 -1.80 20.70 
--------
• :llonth for which price foreca"t was made . 
•• Actual price change between December 1947 and June 1948 . 
••• Actual price change between December 1948 and June 1949. 
--- --
1949 
Most probable Revision Cur-price tor 1949 in rent Realized forecast in averagf> priee priee 
expect"d change*** D"c. '48 Jun" '49 price 
$ 2.08 $ 1.94 $ -.12 $ -.33 $ 2.03 
27.58 25.82 -1.76 -2.00 25.14 
20.91 20.64 -.27 
I 
+1.61 22.57 
1.07 .94 -.13 -.02 1.08 
17.21 15.85 -1.36 -2.20 14.70 
00 
"" ~
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REVISIONS AFTER A 6-:UONTH 
INTERVAL 
Table 15 shows the means of farmers' 
most probable prices at the time of 
the 'December and June surveys for 
1948 and 1949. The June 1948 average 
forecasts were higher than those of 
the preceding December for soybeans, 
grain-fed cattle and feeder calves. 
There was no appreciable difference 
in the average forecast for corn, where-
as the mean of the expected hog prices 
Was lower in June than in December. 
In 1949 the June forecasts averaged 
lower than those of the previous De-
cember for all products. 
With two exceptions, noted below. 
the direction of the changes in the 
means of the most probable prices 
was the same as the direction of the 
changes in actual prices between the 
December and June forecasts of both 
years. 
The average producer failed to re-
duce his June 1948 price expectation 
for corn, despite a decline of about 35 
cents per bushel in the market price 
between December and June. A sub-
stantial part of this decline was an 
adjustment to the prospects of a larger 
crop. Most farmers, however. had 
allowed for the price effects of a 
larger crop in their December fore-
cast. Apparently they associated the 
adjustment in market prices with the 
expected increase in production and 
so made no further downward revision 
in their June forecast. 
While the price of feeder cattle in-
creased about $1.60 per hundredweight 
between December and June, the mean 
of the June 1949 forecasts was slightly 
below that of the preceding December. 
However. this difference is of doubtful 
significance. Producers who revised 
their expectations upward were nearl~' 
equal in number to those who revised 
their expectations downward and the 
average size of these revisions was 
very similar. In contrast. three-fourths 
or more of the producers who modified 
their 1949 corn and hog expectations 
revised them in the same direction. 
Did the lapse of 6 months' time help 
the accuracy of farmers' forecasts? 
The data in table 16 shed light on 
this question. They show the ab-
solute errors in the December and 
June forecasts for 1948 and 1949_ 
These data show that the mean ab-
solute error for both ~'ears combined 
was smaller for the June forecasts in 
onl~' 50 percent of the cases. This 
suggests that product for product, the 
June forecasts were no more accurate 
than the forecasts of the preceding De-
cember. In some cases the differences 
were small and of doubtful significance. 
Moreover, most of the increases in 
forecast accuracy occurred in only one 
of the two years. The June forecasts 
were more accurate than the December 
forecasts for foul' out of the five prod-
ucts in 1948, while just the reverse 
was true in 1949. 
The revisions between December and 
June reduced the accuracy of the ex-
pectations for soybeans in 1948 as 
well as in 1949. On the other hand. 
the June forecasts were more accurate 
for hogs in both years. Data for a 
longer period are needed to provide an 
adequate basis for testing the hypo-
thesis that the average forecasting 
error is smaller for June than for De-
cember forecasts. 
TABLE 16. CO)IPARISOX OF ABSOLUTE ERRORS IX EXPECTATIOXS AFTER 
A 6-)[ONTH INTERVAL. 
Absolute error· 
Product Date Forecasts for 1948 \ Forecasts for 1949 
Dec. survey I June "urve>' Dec. sUl'vey I June ,mrvey 
I I I Soybeans Nov. $ .95 I $1.18 I $ .66 I $ .79 Grain-fed cattle July 9.43 I 6.83 I 7.23 I 7.78 Feeder calves Oct. 8.32 I 7.12 I 6.5" I 7.52 Corn Dec. ,43 I .40 I .23 I .27 Hogs Dec. 4.69 I 3.04 I 3.77 ! 3.37 
• Average dIfference between the most probable pr\c" and the real/zed price disregard-
Ing signs. 
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TABLE 17. REASONS GIVEN FOR REVISING PRICE EXPECTATIONS 
BETWEEN DECEMBER 1948 AND JUNE 1949. 
Corn 
Forecast for 
Reason Dec. '49 (Percent of 
those 
answering) 
Larger supply 54.S 
General price decline 12.9 
Government price 
support program 16.4 
Smaller supply 0.5 
Price-cost prospects 1.2 
Increased market 
demand 0.0 
Other reasons 1.0 
No specifiC reasons 13.2 
Total 100.0 
Number of farmers 
questioned 162 
Three considerations appear to have 
been uppermost in the minds of farm-
ers revising their expectations for 
corn, hogs and feeder calves between 
December 1948 and June 1949 (table 
17). They were: (1) changes in sup-
ply, (2) a decline in the general price 
level, and (3) government price sup-
port programs. 
A majority of farmers revised their 
corn and hog expectations downward 
in June 1949. The principal reason 
given was a larger supply than had 
been anticipated in December. 
Revisions in the expected price for 
feeder calves were divided about 
equally between upward and down-
Hogs Feeder calves 
Forecast for Forecast for 
Dec. '49 Oct. '49 (Percent of (Percent of 
those those 
answering) answering) 
45.3 7:6 
15.3 24.2 
16.1 0.4 
4.5 23.5 
1.3 2.9 
0.0 2.7 
0.3 2.1 
17.5 36.6 
100.0 100.0 
138 139 
ward adjustments. Nearly one-fourth 
of the farmers revising their esti-
mates gave a decline in the general 
price level as a reason. About the 
same proportion gave as a reason an 
anticipated smaller supply of calves 
on the market. However, over one-
third gave no specific reasons for re-
vising their forecast for feeder calves. 
Table 18 provides a comparison of 
the ranges and ratios of expected 
prices for corn and hogs in 1948 and 
1949. This comparison indicates the 
change in degree of subjective un-
certainty between the December and 
June forecasts. The differences in 
each case were statistically significant 
TABLE 18. COMPARISON OF THE RANGES AND RATIOS FOR CORN AND 
HOGS FOR THE DECE:\1BER AND JUNE FORECASTS FOR 1948 'AND 1949. 
-
Forecast for corn in December Forecast for hogs In December 
Forecasts for Forecasts for Forecasts for Forecasts for 
1948 1949 1948 1949 
Dec. I June Dec. I June Dec. I June Dec. I June 
'47 '48 '48 '49 '47 '48 '48 '49 
survey survey survey survey survey survey survey survey 
I I I I 
Lowest expected I I I I price • $1.08 I $1.09 $ .77 $ .73 $16.82 1$15.33 $13.50 1$13.54 1\1ost probable I ! I I price 1.51 I 1.52 1.07 I .94 22.26 I 20.19 17.12 I '15.85 Highest expected I I I price •• 2.34 I 2.50 1.58 I 1.30 28.02 I 26.62 23.38 1 20.17 Range 1.26 I 1.41 .81 .51 11.20 11.19 9.88 I 6.63 Ratio I I I I (Range/"IPP) .S3 1 .93 .76 I .61 .50 I .55 .58 I .45 
• Based on a lout of 100 chance that the reallzed price would be lower . 
•• Based on a lout of 100 chance that the realized price would be higher. 
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TABLE 19. ANALYSIS OF VARIANCES AXD RANGES AND RATIOS. 
Comparison Item 
1) Dec. '47 June '48 ranges 
Hogs: ranges 
VS. for 1948 forecasts 1 and 336 4.14 
2) Dec. '48 VS. June '49 ranges for 1949 forecasts 1 and 296 27.04 
~) Dec. '47 '48 
Hogs: ratios 
vs. June ratios for 1948 forecasts and 334 9.26 
4) Dec. '4~ VS, June '49 ratios for 1949 forecasts and 332 7.21 
Corn: ranges 
5) Dee. '47 VS. June '48 ranges for 1948 forecasts 1 and 334 4.80 
0) Dec. '48 vs. June '49 ranges for 1949 forecasts 1 and 306 32.62 
Corn: ratios 
7) Dec. '47 vs. June '48 ratios for 1948 forecasts 1 and 334 5.06 
8) Dec. '48 VS. June '49 ratios for 1949 forecasts 1 and 306 16.21 
•. Values of F are all significant at the 5 percent level of probabllity. 
at the 5 percent level of probability 
(table 19). 
In the absence of major changes 
in the economic setting, it would be 
expected that the ranges and the 
ratios would decline between December 
and June. This would indicate a 
smaller amount of uncertainty for the 
shorter period estimates. With re 
spect to the 1948 forecasts, however, 
farmers apparently viewed their June 
estimates' with greater uncertainty 
than those of the preceding December. 
There were several reasons for this. 
The December estimates were mostly 
based upon the assumption that grow-
ing conditions for corn would be aver-
age in 1948. During the survey period 
in June a substantial number of farm-
ers expressed concern over the laCk 
of rainfall in late }iay and early June. 
A few even went so far as to predict 
another drouth and a poor corn crop. 
This uncertainty about growing con-
ditions undoubtedly prompted man~' 
farmers to widen their range of ex-
pected corn prices. The uncertainty 
over the corn crop in turn probably 
affected their range of hog prices. 
Actuallr, growing conditions improved 
rapidly shortl)· after the survey was 
conducted, and the 1948 crop turned 
out to be very large. 
In addition, some new variables were 
beginning to affect the thinking of 
farmers, although there was consider-
able uncertainty as to just what the 
effects would be on prices. The "cold 
war" was becoming more evident and 
greater probabilities were being at-
tached to real war. 
In contrast to the 1948 ratios be-
tween December and June, the 1949 
ratios showed a significant decline~in 
uncertainty for both corn and hogs. 
Evidently in 1949 farmers had more 
confidence in their June forecasts than 
in their December forecasts. Probably 
one factor explaining this decline in 
uncertainty was the weather situation 
at the time of the June 1948 inter-
views. 
With the passage of time, the range 
of possible outcomes can be narrowed 
and subjective uncertainty can be 
lessened. This prompts producers to 
introduce flexibility into their pro-
duction plans and to maintain liquidity. 
By keeping some flexibility the farmer 
is in a better position to bide his time, 
obtain additional information and re-
duce subjective uncertaint~·. to a point 
where the commitment of resources 
involves a smaller likelihood of loss. 
The combination of additional in-
formation and flexibility, however, does 
not gUarantee SUccess. It only serves 
to increase the probability that ex-
pectations will be more accurate and 
that plans will be better adapted. 
Some farmers may go sO far in at-
tempting to obtain additional infor-
mation to reduce their uncertainty 
that the opportunity for profitable in-
vestment disappears before they have 
come to a decision. 
::\)oreo\'er, flexibility and liquidity 
cannot be maintained without cost. Up 
to a point they may add to long-run 
profits, but if pushed too far the ad-
ditional returns will not cover the ad-
ditional costs. 
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TABLE 20. CO:VIPARIS0~ OF FORECASTS OF CORX, HOG AXD BU'l.'TERFAT 
PRICES FOR 1949 :VIADE DECEMBER 1947, DECE:VIBER 1948 
AND JUNE 1949 
Corn Hogs 
FOI'ecast 
I 
Forecast 
I made for EITor* made for Error' Dec. 1949 Dec. 1949 
(dollars.per bu.) (dollars per 100 lb~.) 
Foreca~t made in 
Dec. 1947 1.23 
Forecast made in 
Dec. 1948 1.07 
J<'orecast made in 
June 1949 .94 
Realized price for 1949 LOS 
Actual price change 
hetween Dec. 1947 
and Dec. 1948 
-1.41 
Actual price change 
between Dec. 1948 
and June 1949 .02 
• , . Forec,lst PI Ice mmus 1 eahzed llnce . 
REVISIONS IN LONG-TER:Vl 
EXPECTATIONS 
In December 1947 farmers were 
asked what prices they considered 
most probable for corn and hogs in 
December 1949. Comparable estimates 
were also obtained in December 1948 
and again in June 1949. The means of 
these forecasts for December 1949 
made over periods of 24, 12 and 6 
months are presented in table 20. 
The average expected price for both 
corn and hogs declined as producers 
r!lvised their estimates after December 
1947. These revisions were consistent 
with the longer-run forecasts made in 
December 1947 for a period extending 
to 1955. During this time the de-
cision-making psychology was one of 
depression and price decline. The 
changes in market prices between De-
cember 1947 and June 1949 tended to 
reinforce belief that lower prices were 
in store for the future. 
+ .15 17.60 +2.90 
-
.01 17.21 +2.51 
-
.14 H.85 +1.15 
-- 14.70 --
I 
-- -4.20 --
2.20 
The revisions of corn prices between 
December 1947 and December 1948 in-
creased the accuracy of the December 
1949 mean forecast. However, modifi-
cations in the June 1949 mean fore· 
cast took farmers farther away from 
the realized price. In part this may 
have been the result of increased 
skepticism over the effectiveness of 
the 1949 support program. 
On the other hand, the revisions for 
hogs increased the accuracy of the 
mean forecast each time. The differ-
ence between the mean forecast and 
the realized price went from $'2.90 to 
$2.51 and finally to $1.15. Evidently 
producers were able to improve the ac· 
curac~- of their hog forecasts with the 
approach of the date for which the 
forecasts were being made. 
In December 1947 farmers estimated 
the most probable price of corn in De-
cember 1950, 1951 and 1955. A com-
parable .estimate for the same dates 
TABLE 21. REVISIONS IN LONG-RANGE PRrCE EXPECTATIONS FOR CORN 
AFTER AN INTERVAL OF 18 :VIO~THS. 
Foreca;;t Foreca;;t price mAde in made in Realized 
Decemher 1947 June 1949 
Price for December 
1950 $1.08 .86 $1.43 
Price for Decemiler 
1951 .96 .S5 1.61 
Price for DecemiJer 
1955 .84 .79 
was made in June 1949. The means of 
the most probable prices forecast in 
December 1947 and June 1M9 are 
shown in table 21. 
In December 1947 farmers on the 
average were expecting a decline in 
corn prices between 1950 and 1955. 
While a slight decline was also fore-
cast in June 1949, the base from which 
the decrease was expected to occur was 
reduced. The mean estimate for De-
cember 1950 was reduced from $1.08 
per bushel in the December 1947 fore-
casts to 86 cents per bushel in the June 
1949 forecasts. 
It is apparent that neither of the 
forecasts anticipated the outbreak of 
the Korean war in .Tune 1950. As a 
consequence, the errors in expectations 
for 1950 and 1951 were large. Since 
most farmers revised their estimates 
downward in .Tune 1949, the magnitude 
of the errors increased over the 18-
month period from December 1947 to 
June 1949. This provides a good il-
lustration of the case where a sudden 
shift in the expectational framework 
may decrease the accuracy of expec-
tations formulated just prior to the 
shift as compared to those formulated 
at an earlier date. 
The reasons given by farmers in 
June 1949 for revising their long·range 
expectations for corn are summarized 
in table 22. A very large proportion 
of producers gave no specific reasons 
for their revisions. Moreover, the pro-
portion increased from roughly one-
third for the 1951 revision to over one-
half for the 1955 revIsIOn. This is 
not too surprising since the basis for 
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modifying long-range expectations is 
necessarily very vague and the am-
biguity tends to increase with the 
length of the expectational period. 
Not infrequentl.\· a farmer would say 
in effect "I feel the price wiII be lower 
(higher), but I don't know just why." 
In such cases it was usually clear that 
the belief existed, yet it was impossible 
to identify the reasons for it. 
Among farmers who did specify 
reasons for their revision for 1951, 
supply changes, changes in the general 
price level and government support 
programs were mentioned most fre-
quently. Changes in the general price 
level and government support programs 
were given as the two principal reasons 
for revising 1955 expectations. 
CHOICE BETWEEN CERTAIN 
AND UNCERTAIN PRICE 
Generally speaking, businessmen pre-
fer ventures involving little risk to 
those involving great risk when in-
come expectations are the same. Risk 
aversion is especially prevalent among 
people who possess little capital, have 
a high ratio of liabilities to assets, 
have major family responsibilities and 
have experienced important setbacks 
in their economic careers. 
Most farmers are willing to bear 
appreciable uncertainty. If this were 
not true, more farmers would accept 
lower paid jobs outside of agriculture 
where there is less uncertainty. 
The problem of selecting the opti-
mum combination of risk and expected 
income can be illustrated by fig. 3. In 
TABLE 22. REASONS GIVEN FOR REVISIXG LOXG-RANGE PRICE EXPECTA-
TIONS FOR CORN BE'rWEEN DECE~IBER 1947 AND JUNE 1949 . 
... -
Revision for 1951 Rel'ision for 1955 
Reason (Percent of (Percent of 
those answering) those answering) 
Change in general price level 12.5 1:;.2 
Change in sU]l]lI~' 19.1 9.1 
Government price support program 17.1 13.1 
Future ~'ield prospects 10.3 1.2 
Former prediction basee! on wrong ine!icator 4.8 5.2 
Change in e!emand 2.8 1.1 
Other reasons 1.6 1.2 
No specific reasonH 31.8 5:1.9 
Total 
I 
100.0 100.0 
Number of farmers answering 16S 163 
N 
'" :l! 0 
u 
~ 
W 
..l R CD 
'" III 
0 
0: 
n. 
... p 
'" 0 
:l! 
L 
RANGE OF INCOME 
Fig. 3. Illustration of optimum choice 
under condition of risk. 
this diagram the vertical axis measures 
the most probable expected income, 
while the horizontal axis meaSUres 
the degree of risk-represented here 
by the range of expected income. The 
line OR is the individual's oppor-
tunity curve, showing the various com-
binations of most probable income 
and risk open to him. The curve as-
sumes that to enjoy a higher most 
probable income it is necessary to ac-
cept a larger possible income range. 
The slope represents the marginal 
rate of transformation between the 
risk attached to investments with 
possible high and low income and the 
most probable income. It diminishes 
as the degree of risk increases. The 
line AN represents the individual's in-
difference curve-the combinations of 
risk J.nd most probable income to 
which the individual is indifferent. 
The marginal rate of substitution be. 
tween range of income and most prob-
able income is assumed to increase 
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with increases in the degree 'of risk. 
In order for an individual to receive 
income he must be willing to run cer-
tain risks. As he moves toward R 
along OR, higher most probable income 
is accompanied by greater risk. Opti-
mum choice is indicated by tangency 
of the two curves-representing equal-
ity between the marginal rate of trans-
formation and the marginal rate of 
SUbstitution. Movements beyond point 
P involve increases in risk which are 
not sufficiently compensated for by a 
higher most probable income. This is 
indicated by the fact that curve AN 
, (to the right of P) lies entirely above 
curve OR. 
To give some idea of the farmers' 
willingness to accept price uncertainty 
and to show its relation to price sup-
port programs, producers Were asked 
what level of guaranteed prices would 
leave them, in their 'own mind, jUst as 
well off as the uncertain most probable 
prices specified earlier. In other words, 
would a guaranteed price involving 
no uncertainty-implemented by loans 
or other techniques-fall below their 
most probable price expectation and, 
if so, by how much? Just what level 
of price guarantees would be as ac-
ceptable, to farmers as their most prob-
able price? This question was put to 
farmers in December 1947 and applied 
to their expectations for 1948. Table 
23 shows the means of the estimates of 
all farmers. f 
The average certain price for corn 
was exactly eqllal to the average ex-
pected price. This indicates that 
farmers were indifferent between a 
most probable price of $1.51 per bushel 
and the same price without uncer-
tainty. This does not mean, however, 
that farmers had a positive risk pref-
erence. As .noted earlier, the expec-
tation distribution for corn was skewed 
TABLE 23. CO:o.lPARISON OF LO,\YEST ACCEPTABLE GUARX:,TEED PHICES 
A::oJD UNCERT AI::oJ :o.roST PROBABLE PRICES FOR 
1948, DECE:'IBER 1947 SURVEY. 
I Lowe«t acceptable :'lo~t prohable 
Product :o.ronth guaranteed J)rice price for 
for 1948 1948 
Corn December 
I 
$ L51 $ 1.51 
Hogs December 19.90 20.56 
Grain·fed cattle July 20.30 30.54 
Butterfat June .59 .72 
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toward higher prices. The price sup-
port program was looked upon as 
setting a "floor" under prices. Thus 
p;oducers may have considered a 
hIgher certain price "necessary to com-
pe~sate for the greater probability 
WhICh they attached to prices higher 
than the most probable price. 
A commitment to accept a certain 
price means that the farmer eliminates 
the possibility of higher as well as 
lower prices. If the farmer's distribu-
tion is sufficiently skewed toward 
hi~her prices, he will not accept a cer-
tam prIce much below his most prob-
able price. A number of farmers 
mentioned this in their interviews. 
Furthermore, While the means of 
the est~mated certain and most prob· 
able pnces were equal, nearly 45 per-
cent of the farmers indicated they 
would accept a certain price for corn 
which was lower than their uncertain 
ll!-0st probable price. A detailed analy-
SIS of these relationships is needed 
to shed further light on this case. 
Farmers on the average stated they 
W?Uld accept a certain hog price 
shghtly. lower than their most prob. 
able prIce. The distribution of ex-
pected prices for hogs was more nearly 
"normal" than for corn. 
The acceptable certain price for 
butterfat was 18 percent below the 
most probable price, While that for 
grain-fed cattle was one-third lower. 
While information about the distri-
bution of expected prices was not ob-
tained for butterfat and grain-fed cat-
tle, it is generally recognized that 
cattle feeding in one of the most un-
certain farm enterprises.l1 A sub-
stantial part of the uncertainty in the 
cattle enterprise involves prices. Con- . 
sequently, farmers prefer a much lower 
certain price. 
These data suggest that price support 
programs designed to guide farm pro-
duction need to take account of differ· 
ences in the degree of subjective un-
certainty surrounding expectations for 
various products. A price support of a 
floor type may have little effect on the 
allocation of resources in cases where 
the expectations of farmers are held 
with a high degree of subjective cer· 
tainty, or where the distribution of ex-
17 For evidence on this point see table 
37. 
pected prices is sharply sl\ewed toward 
higher prices. 
If the support price is sufficiently 
below expectations, it may not increase 
the farmer's level of satisfaction by im-
proving the subjective aspects of in-
come or by increasing the ease of de-
cision-making. On the other hand the 
support price may not need to be as 
high for a product with a highly un-
certain price to aid in production 
planning or to reduce the frUstration 
and disutility associated with planning 
in a highly uncertain environment. 
PRICE UNCERTAINTY AND HOG 
PRODUCTION 
DiSCOUnting of uncertain prices will 
probably reduce the quantity of output 
planned for a product compared to 
what it would be if prices were certain. 
To gain some understanding of the im-
pact of price uncertainty upon produc-
tion plans, farmers were asked to give 
their estimates of production plans for 
hogs under conditions of price cer-
tainty. By comparing these plans with 
those actually developed, a basis was 
provided for determining the effects of 
price uncertainty. 
The data probably provide a reason-
ably accurate indication of the direc-
tion of the effects, if not of the magni-
tude. The questions relating to plans 
under conditions of certaintv were 
asked after farmers had indicated their 
actual plans for the coming year. The 
results are presented in table 24. 
Farmers in the Southern Iowa sam-
ple farrowed an average of 5.2 lit· 
ters of spring pigs in 1947. In De-
cember 1947 they were planning to 
farrow 4.5 litters in the spring of 1948. 
In part, these plans were based upon 
price expectations for the year ahead. 
However, if the government were to 
guarantee the price of corn and hogs 
at the level of their most probable ex-
pectations, farmers said they would 
farrow 7.6 litters of spring pigs. For 
1949, with a longer period for the ad-
justment of farrowing equipment, labor 
and other resources, farmers planned 
to farrow 8.7 litters or springs pigs if 
the guaranteed prices (still at the 
levels of the most probable prices in 
1948) were extended for the 2-year 
period. If the same prices Were gllar· 
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TABLE 24. PROJECTED EFFECT OF 
PRICE UNCERTAINTY ON FARMERS' 
PLANS FOR SPRING PIGS. DECElI-
BER 1948 SURVEY. 
Average 
Litters actually farrowed 
in 1947 5.2 
Litters planned for 1948 
as of December 1947 
with price uncertainty· 4.5 
Litters actually farrowed 
In 1948 4.4 
Litters planned for 1948 
on assumpeion that prices 
for hogs and corn were 
guaranteed at levels con-
sidered most probable by 
individual farmers· 7.6 
Litters planned for 1949 
on assumption these 
prices were guaranteed 
for 2 )·ear... S.7 
Litters planned for 1950 
on m.sumption the!;e 
prices were guaranteed 
for 3 )'ears S.7 
* The means of the most probable prices 
expected for corn and hogs for Decem-
ber 1948 as of December 1947 were ~1.51 
and $22.25, respectively. The mean!; of 
the range of eXllected prices were $1.27 
for corn and $11.14 for hogs. 
anteed for 3 years, farmers indicated 
theJ' would farrow the same number 
in 1950 as in 1949. The change for 
1948-in the absence of price uncer-
tainty-represented an increase of 3.1 
litters or 66 percent. 
Figure 4 shows the relation between 
the projected increases in farrowings 
under certain prices and the amount 
of equity capital possessed by farmers.'" 
There was a tendency for absolute 
changes in fa 1'1'0 wings to increase with 
increases in the amount of owned 
capital, except at the extreme end of 
the capital distribution. 
On the other hand, the percentage 
increases in farrowings tended to be 
inVersely related to the quantity of 
owned capital. Farmers with large 
amounts of capital planned to farrow 
larger numbers of litters under both 
price uncertainty and price certainty. 
However, the percentage increase due 
to the reduction in uncertainty tended 
to be larger for farmers with small 
amounts of capital. Producers who 
owned less than $500 of capital thought 
they would increase fan' owings 170 
percent if prices were guaranteed at 
,. Estimates of farmers' net worth were 
obtained in the August 1941 survey. 
the most probable levels. At the other 
extreme, farmers who owned $35,000 to 
$40,000 of capital indicated they would 
increase output by only 10 percent. 
Evidently the impact of price uncer-
tainty upon production plans is much 
greater for farmers with small amounts 
of capital. . 
Other things being equal, producers 
with small amounts of equtty capital 
will tend to discount uncertain prices 
more than those with large amounts. 
The evidence, while certainly not con-
clusive, tends to support this hypo-
thesis. 
The distribution of expected corn-hog 
ratios for December 1948-based upon 
the most probable prices anticipated 
for corn and hogs-is shown in table 
25. A substantially larger proportion 
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Fig. 4. Relation between projected in-
crease In planned farrowing" under price 
certainty and the quantity of equity caoi-
tal [ler farmer. 
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of farmers underestimated the realized 
ratio than overestimated it. About 35 
percent of the group predicted ratios 
equal to or less than the long-time 
average for the area. 
When questioned as to why more 
spring litters were not planned for 
1948, farmers listed four major rea-
sons: (1) limited housing, (2) larger 
profits expected from other enterprises, 
(3) hog price uncertainty, and (4) 
limited supplies of feed and labor. 
Since this question was asked prior 
to that relating to plans under con-
ditions of price certainty, some farmers 
undoubtedly expected to purchase ad-
ditional feed If prices were guaranteed. 
TABLE 25. DISTRIBUTION OF EX-
PECTED CORN-HOG PRICE RATIOS 
FOR DECE:\1BER 1948. DECE:\1BER 
1947 SURVEY .• 
Corn-hog 
price ratio 
8 - 9.9 
10 - 11.9 
12 -13.9 
14 - 15.9 
16 -17.9 
18 - 19.9 
20-21.9 
22 - 23.9 
24 - 25.9 
26 and over 
Total 
I ::-lumber I of farmer,.; 
4 I 
25 I 43 
18 I 36 
9 I 
14 I 
~ I 
159 
• The realized ratio was 17.4. 
Relative 
Frequency 
2.5 
15.7 
27.0 
11.3 
22.6 
5.6 
8.8 
2.0 
2.5 
2.0 
100.0 
CROP YIELD EXPECTATIONS 
Farmers' production plans are con 
dltioned not only by price expectations 
but also by technical expectations-
i. e., expectations about phYsical Input-
output, SUbstitution relationships and 
production techniques. For example, 
what the farmer thinks the most profit-
able rate of. seeding is will depend 
partly upon what he expects the yield 
to be from different seeding rates. And 
his selection of the lowest cost ration 
for the production of beef will be infiu~ 
encedby his ideas about the rates of 
substitution between feeds. 
Imperfect knowledge of the physical 
conditions of production gives rise to 
uncertain technical expectations. Since 
this knowledge -is incomplete, produc-
ers are unable to accuratelY predict 
the effects of changes in iilputs. Be-
cause of difficulties of predicting new 
technological developments· and the 
changes they produce in physical re-
lationships, farmers are uncertain 
about the rate -of obsolescence and 
about the adoption of new production 
techniques. 
Furthermore, some of the variables 
entering the production functions of 
farm products are not subject to con-
trol-a situation largely peculiar to 
agriculture. Weather and to some ex-
tent the diseases of plants and animals 
fall in this category. As a result the 
same application of inputs by.the farm-
er will not alwars produce the same 
output. It may produce a large output 
one year and a small one the next. 
Natural phenomena are particularly 
important in the production functions 
for crops. While knowledge of the fre-
quency distribution of yields over time 
would permit the accurate prediction 
of the mean yield, prediction for any 
specific ~'ear remains impossible. If a 
farmer planned for an average yield 
and the actual yield turned· out to be 
either higher ·01' lower, production 
plans would not be consistent with 
maximum ex lwst profits. 
So long as weather and other natural 
phenomena cannot be predicted with-
out error, yield expectations will be 
uncertain and inaccurate. And as long 
as they are uncertain and inaccurate 
it will be impossible to eliminate all 
the mis-allocations of resources in crop 
production. It is possible, however, to 
avoid some of the more important con-
sequences of yield variability by stor-
age, crop insurance, forward pricing 
and other private and public policies. 
To learn more about crop yield ex-
pectations, farmers were asked their 
anticipated average rields and expected 
yield distributions for corn, oats and 
hay. The distributions of expected 
yields indicate the degree of uncertain-
ty attached to yield expectations in a 
particular ~·ear. Data to permit the 
estimation of errors in yield expecta-
tions similar to those prepared for 
price expectations are available only 
for 1948. 
Recent yield experience and yield ex-
pectations for corn, oats and hay are 
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TABLE 26. AVERAGE YIELD EXPERIENCE AND ANTICIPATED YIELDS FOR 
CORN. OATS AND HAY. 
Corn Oats Hay (bu.) (bu.) ( tons) 
Average estimated yield during 1943-1947 (June 1948 
survey) 39.3 29.1 1.4 
Average yield expected for 1948 estimated in June 1948 45.1 34.6 0.9 
Actual estimated yield for 1948 49.1 36.2 0.8 
Average yield expected over next 20 years estimated 
In June 1948 45.5 34.4 1.5 
Average estimated yield during 1944-1948 (June 1949 
survey) 41.7 32.6 -Average yield expected for 1949 estimated in June 1949 48.2 ·33.6 4.9 
summarized in table 26. In June 1948 
the average expected yields for corn 
and oats exceeded the average yield ex-
perience during the preceding 5 years. 
Rainfall was short at the time of the 
survey. While this prompted a few 
producers to predict lower yields and 
increased the uncertain tv in the fore-
casts of many others, the majority of 
farmers were looldng for higher yields 
of corn and oats (table 27). However, 
most farmers were anticipating lower 
yields of hay. The lack of moisture in 
late May and early June had alread~' 
produced a noticeable effect on the hay 
crop and a majority of producers were 
convinced that this effect could not be 
offset by favorable weather dUring the 
rest of the growing season. The aver-
age yield expected for hay was only 
about two-thirds of the 5-year average. 
In June 1949 a majority of producers 
were anticipating favorable yields for 
all three crops. Farmers were expect-
ing a bumper hay crop, a corn yield 
only slightly less than the high yield 
of 1948, and an oat yield which was 
above the average of the preceding 5 
years but below the yield of 1948. 
Most farmers were predicting an in-
crease in long-term yields. Compared 
to average yields realized during the 
5 years 1943 to 1947, the long-term 
forecasts of average yields over the 
next 20 years showed a 16 percent in· 
crease for corn, an 18 percent increase 
for oats and a 7 percent increase for 
hay. In this connection it is of inter-
est to note what agronomic and farm 
management speci~lists have said 
about the potential increase in future 
~'ields of corn, oats and hay for this 
general area.'" In 1951 it was estimat-
ed that. under favorable price and cost 
conditions and on the assumption that 
most effective production practices 
would be employed, the yield of corn 
in the Southern Pasture area as a 
whole could be increased from 43.9 
bushels per acre in 1950 (adjusted 
yield) to 76.6 bushels in 1955. This is 
an increase of 74 percent in a 5-year 
period. The estimated potential in-
crease for oats amounted to 86 percent. 
While a normal yield for 1950 was not 
established for hay, the anticipated in-
crease from the adoption of most effec-
tive practices for hay and pasture com-
bined was about 1.8 tons per acre. 
These estimates were based upon 
known techniques and do not take in-
to account new technological develop-
ments. While there are important dif-
ferences underlying the estimates of 
~ State College. Agr. Exp. Sta. and 
Agr. Ext. Servo An appraisal of agri-
cultural productive capacity In Iowa AN 
153. February 1952. 
TABLE 27. PERCE""TAGE OF FAR;\lERS EXPECTING 1948 YIELDS HIGHER. 
LOWER, OR SA;\IE AS OVER THE PAST 5 YEARS. 
JUXE 1948 SURVEY. 
Corn Oats Hay 
Higher yields expected In 1948 57% 61% 6% 
Lower yields expected In 1948 14 19 69 
Same yields expected in 1948 29 20 25 
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TABLE 28. REASONS GIVEN BY FAR)IERS FOR THEIR 1948 YIELD 
EXPECTATIONS IN JUNE 1948. 
Expecting 1948 yields to be higher than during the past 5 years 
Percent of farmers reporting 
Reason 
Corn Oats Hay 
'Veather 34.7 20.6 38.2 
FertiJ1t~· improvement practices· 12.6 13.6 32.7 
Improved land use practices 13.5 7.0 6.4 
Improved seed variety 3.6 33.4 0.0 
Price·cost prospects 17.6 16.1 6.4 ]\1ore fertile soil this year 7.0 0.1 0.0 
5·year average below 'normal 8.4 5.4 0.0 
No reason 2.6 3.8 16.3 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Expecting 1948 yields to be lower than durmg the past 5 years 
Reason 
'Yeather 
Insect infe"tations·· 
LeHs fertile land 
Poorer land practices 
Reduced feed supply 
5-year average above normal 
:'I1!scellaneous 
No reason 
Total 
• Fertllizer, lime and green manure . 
•• Corn borer, cutworm and grasshopper. 
the specialists and the forecasts of 
farmers, nevertheless, the comparison 
suggests that farmers were far more 
pessimistic about future increases in 
crop yields than were the specialists. 
It further suggests that there may be 
a wide difference between the produc-
tion techniques actually used by farm-
ers and those which would be most 
profitable. 
Generally weather was the most im-
portant single factor inflUencing the 
Percent of farmers reporting 
COl'n Oats Hay 
57.3 84.8 61.6 
20.8 5.2 1.1' 
12.4 5.9 0.5 
0.0 2.9 2.6 
0.0 0.0 28.0 
9.5 0.6 0.1 
0.0 0.0 1.1 
0.0 0.6 5.0 
100.0 100.0 100.0 
yield expectations of most farmers in 
both 1948 and 1949 (tables 28 and 29). 
)'lany farmers were using an expecta-
tion model which implied that low 
yields one year (1947) would be fol-
lowed br high yields the next (1948). 
Some reasoned that since 1947 crops 
of corn and oats took less out of the 
soil, 1948 yields would be higher. In 
1948 farmers who expected yields to be 
lower than average tended to place 
more emphasis on the weather. Among 
TABLE 29. REASONS GIVEN BY FAR)IERS FOR THEIR 1949 YIELD 
. EXPECTATIONS IN JUNE 1949 . 
Rea"on Corn Oats Hay 
'Veather 43.7 24.3 10.5 
5·year average below normal 7.8 20.9 65.9 
Improved land use practices 10.6 1.2 1.7 
Improved seea variety 0.7 12.7 3.8 
Fertility Improvement practices 12.4 8.7 2.0 
More fertile soil thIs year 15.2 8.9 0.0 
5·year average for farm unknown 3.7 5.0 4.5 
:\lIscellaneous 2.1 9.6 9.7 
No reason 3.8 8.7 1.9 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
874 
TABLE 30. ERRORS IN YIELD EXPECTATIONS FOR CORN, OATS AND HAY 
FOR 1948. 
Corn Oat3 Hay ( bu.) ( bu.) (tons) 
Average yield expected for 1948 45.1 34.6 0.9 
Average actual yield in 1948 49.1 36.2 0.8 
Average error for farmers underestimating yield 18.1 13.5 1.0 
Average error tor farmers ovel'estimating' yield 21.4 15.5 1.4 
Average absolute error (signs disregarded) 
farmers with higher than average ex-
pected yields, increased use of ferti-
lizers and lime, improved land use 
practices and price-cost prospects af-
fecting soil investments were consid-
ered to be relatively more important. 
A number of farmers added an incre-
ment to their past yield experience as 
an allowance for the adoption of new 
oats varieties which were expected to 
increase yields. About 33 percent of 
the farmers who forecast higher yields 
for oats in 1948 gave improved vari-
eties as the major reason. A few farm-
ers were Using a forecasting model 
which implied that poor weather comes 
in sequences. Since 1947 was a bad 
year, they expected 1948 to be one also. 
While weather was the predominat-
ing consideration in expectations for 
corn in 1949, only 10 percent of the 
group mentioned it in connection with 
their expectations for hay. Almost 
two-thirds of the farmers reporting be-
lieved the average yield for hay over 
the past 5 years was abnormally low 
and gave this as their main reason for 
expecting the 1949 yield to be above 
average. 
Some clues to the errors in yield ex-
pectations are given by the data for 
1948 presented in table 30. In terms 
of the means of the expected and real-
ized yields, farmers on the average un-
derestimated the 1948 yields of corn 
and oats and overestimated the yield 
of hay. The average difference (signs 
disregarded) between the anticipated 
and reali:r.ed yields for individual pro-
ducers was 19 bushels for corn, 13 
bushels for oats and 0.8 ton for hay. 
Farmers who overestimated their real-
ized corn yield had an average error 
of 18 bushels, whereas those who un-
derestimated their realized yield had 
an error of about 21 bushels. 
These large errors are suggestive of 
the difficulties facing farmers in plan-
ning a livestock program based upon 
19.1 12.7 0.8 
expected feed production. If livestocl, 
plans were developed to use feed pro-
duction estimated from planned acre-
age and anticipated yields, it is appar-
ent that some farmers would find ac-
tual feed production substantially less 
than planned while others would find 
it much greater. This would necessi-
tate adjUstments in plans-either in 
livestock, reserves or purchases and 
sales of feed. 
If expected yields fell short of aver-
age reaIi:r.ed yields the adjustment 
problems would be more serious since 
the opportunity for the movement of 
feedstuffs among farmers would be 
more limited. Consequently, revisions 
in livestock and storage plans would 
have to absorb more of the impact of 
errors in yield expectations. Histor-
icallr. changes in reserves have usually 
accompanied flnctuations in feed pro-
duction for the country as a whole. 
However, when large variation in 
yields have occurred, adjustments in 
storage stocks have not been large 
enough to prevent major revisions in 
farmers' longer-run livestock plans. 
As a result year-to-year fluctuations in 
yields have generated short-run insta-
bilities in livestock production. In part. 
the failure of the farmer's storage pol-
icy to carry more of the burden has 
been a consequence of yield and price 
uncertainty. Undoubtedly, limited capi-
tal has also played an important role. 
YIELD UNCERTAINTY 
The degree of uncertainty which the 
farmer attaches to his yield expecta-
tions depends partly upon the variabil-
ity or dispersion of yields over time, 
and the extent to which the distribu-
tion of yields is skewed higher or low-
er than the mean. 
That farmers attached great uncer-
tainty to their yield expectations for 
oats is apparent in table 31. It pro-
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TABLE 31. EXPECTED DISTRIBU-
TION OF OAT YIELDS DURING THE 
NEXT 20 YEARS. JUNE 1948 SURVEY." 
Yield per acre (bushels) 
0- 9.9 
10-19.9 
20-29.9 
30-39.9 
40-49.9 
50-59.9 
60-69.9 
70-79.9 
80-89.9 
Total 
Relative 
frequency 
8.3 
11.9 
22.1 
23.7 
16.6 
10.5 
4.6 
1.9 
0.4 
100.0 
• Weighted distributions of yield~ anti-
cipated by Individual farmers. 
vides a rough indication of the vari-
ance and skewness of the weighted dis-
tributions of yields anticipated by in-
dividual producers. Yields of 30 to 40 
bushels were given the greatest proba-
bility over time, but the likelihood at-
tached to a yield in this range was 
only slightly greater than for yields of 
20 to 30 bushels. 
Also important is the fact that the 
distribution tended to be skewed in 
the direction of higher yields. While 
the nature of the distribution would 
be unimportant if each yield could be 
predicted with certainty, the farmer 
never knows the sequence of yields 
even if he does know the distribution. 
Farmers on the average expected 
about the same degree of variation in 
both future corn and oat yields. The 
mean of the coefficients of variation 
for the individual distributions of ex-
pected yields over the next 20 years 
was 37.1 for corn and 36.8 for oats. As-
suming that the coefficient of variation 
provides a rough measure of subjec-
tive uncertainty, producers evident1~· 
believed that futUre revisions in crop 
plans involving shifts between corn 
and oats would have no appreciable ef-
fect on the degree of over-all yield un-
certainty. 
It is apparent from table 32 that 
farmers were not entirely agreed on 
the amount of variation in future 
yields. In the case of corn about 28 
percent of the group had coefficients 
of variation of less than 30.0, while 
nearly 38 percent had coefficients of 
more than 40.0. The dispersion of 
the coefficients of variation for oats 
TABLE 32. DISTRIBUTION OF THE 
COEFFICIENTS OF VARIATION OF 
EXPECTED OAT AND CORN YIELDS 
DURING THE NEXT 20 YEARS. JUNE 
1948 SURVEY. 
Coefflcien t of Relative frequency 
variation Corn Oats 
0- 9.9 0.6 
10-19.9 6.5 8.3 
20-29.9 21.4 20.2 
30-39.9 27.4 29.3 
40-49.9 27.4 33.3 
50-59.9 8.3 7.7 
60·69.9 2.4 1.2 
Total 100.0 100.0 
Number 
responding 168 168 
• Coefficients of variatIOn were denved 
from the individual farmer distributions 
of expected yields of corn and oats. 
was very similar. Additional informa-
tion and analysis is needed to shed 
light on the factors responsible for 
this variation and on what the dif-
ferential effects are with respect to 
production plans. 
Do farmers who expect a high degree 
of variation in corn yields also antici-
pate a high degree of variation in oat 
yield? And do farmers who expect lit-
tle dispersion in one also expect little 
in the other? Both the regression and 
correlation coefficients for the relation 
between the coefficients of variation 
for corn yields and oat yields were sig-
nificant at the 1 percent level of prob-
ability.'" Evidently farmers who at-
tached a large amount of uncertainty 
to their expectations for corn tended 
to do the same for oats. And farmers 
who attached a low degree of uncer-
tainty to corn expectations also at-
tached a low degree to their expecta-
tions for oats. Insofar as farmers dis-
count their expected yields for uncer-
tainty, the variation of uncertainty 
among farmers would make the dis-
20 The regression coefficient of expected 
corn yield variation on expected oat 
yield variation was 0.735, while the cor-
relation coefficient was 0.687. The value 
of t for the regression coefficient was 
12.7. This compares with the value of t 
at the 1 percent level of significance 
with 166 degrees of freedom of approxi-
mately 2.61. The maximum value of r 
due to chance in a random sample with 
population value of zero and 166 de-
grees of freedom is about 0.208. . 
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TABLE 33. EXPECTED FREQUENCY 
OF FAILURE OF NEW SEEDING OF 
HAY CROPS, JUNE 1948 SURVEY. 
Number of years 
Kind out of 20 new Percent seeding was ex-
pected to fall· 
Alfalfa 3,9 19.5 
Red 
3.5 clover 17.5 
Timothy 1.4 7.0 
* A failure was defined as a new seeding 
which was so poor as to require plow· 
ing up. 
count rates different. But each farmer 
would tend to apply similar rates to 
both crops. 
Why do farmers in Southern Iowa 
continue to plant timothy for hay de-
spite the fact that legumes are gener-
ally recommended? Part of the an-
swer is suggested by the data in table 
33, showing how frequently farmers 
expected to plow up new seedings of 
timothy, alfalfa and clover during a 
20-year period. A failure (plow up) 
of a new seeding of timothy was anti-
cipated about 7 percent of the time. 
On the other hand, failures were ex-
pected nearly 20 percent of the time 
for alfalfa and about l'l percent of the 
time for clover. Since many farmers 
look upon timothy as a "safe" crop, 
they continue to grow it- alone or in 
combination with legumes and grasses 
even though the legumes give a great-
er average yield over time. 
FEED RESERVES 
Year-to-year variations in crop yields 
produce major instability in long-range 
production plans, lower profits for the 
farmer and promote an inefficient use 
of agriculture's resources. The intel-
ligent administration of reserves is 
one of the principal means of avoiding 
some of the more serious consequences 
of errors in yield expectations. 
What constitutes a rational manage-
ment of reserves on the part of the in-
dividual farmer depends upon (1) the 
nature of public storage policy; (2) the 
degree of correlation between the farm-
er's yields and over-all yields and be-
tween yields of different crops; (3) 
the kind of crop and livestock pro-
gram followed; (4) the rates of sub-
stitution between alternative feeds; 
( 5) the cost of storage; ( 6) the ~har­
acteristics of yield variation over time; 
and (7) the farmer's general financial 
position. These factors partly deter-
mine the appropriate average amount 
of reserve to be carried, the extent to 
which the reserve should be held as 
cash and other liquid assets or as phys-
ical commodities, and the management 
of the reserve over time. 
A rough indication of the physical 
reserves of feedstuffs normally main-
tained by farmers in Southern Iowa is 
provided by the data in table 34. Farm-. 
ers on the average stated that when 
the size of the new crop is known they 
normally have on hand about 186 bush-
els of corn and 6.4 tons of hay. They 
also estimated that between the time 
the new crop of corn is known and the 
time it is ready for use their typical 
livestock program required an average 
of 85 bushels, leaving a reserve for the 
following year of about 101 bushels. 
Since pasture is an impo.rtal,lt feed 
source in this area, farmers mIght re-
duce the risk of liquidation during pe-
riods of low yields by limiting ~he 
amount of their pasture-consummg 
livestock in relation to average carry-
ing capacity. About one-half of the 
farmers indicated they normally have 
more pasture available than is needed 
for their livestock. Among these (arm-
ers the amount of the excess was esti-
mated to be sufficient for about 9.8 
head of cattle. 
Were these reserves large or small 
in relation to the feed requirements .of 
the average livestock program? WhIle 
a precise estimate of feed requirements 
is impossible, a crude estimate can be 
made on the basis of the average num-
ber and kind of livestock fed and ap-
proximate feed requirements per head, 
excluding pasture.... In 1948 the aver-
21 Average numbers of livestock in. 1948 
are given in table 38. Approxlmllte 
feed requirements per hend, excludmg 
pasture, were based upon estimates 
prepared by C. ·W. :\fncDonald In ,\p-
proximate feed requirements for bve-
stock, Pam. 121, Agr. Ext. Serv., Io.wa 
State College, June 1947. The f~edmg 
values of various feedstuffs in relatIOn to 
corn used in estimating feed units were 
those reported In USDA Cir. No. 836. 
Consumption of feed by livestock 1909-
47. December 1949. 
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TABLE 34. "NOR:'.[AL" RESERVE OF PRINCIPAL FEEDSTUFFS CARRIED 
BY FAR:\IERS • . 
Corn Hav (bu.) (tons) 
"Normal" sUllply when new crop Is known 186 6.4 
Average amount required b~' livestock until new 
crop Is ready for use 85 
-
Percent of total of 186 farmers who normally have more pas-
ture available than Is needed by livestock 48.9% 
Number of additional cattle that could normally be grazed 
9.8 on excess pasture 
• "Normal" was defined as typical or average. 
age livestock program probably re-
quired somewhere between 2300 and 
2500 feed units or bushels of corn 
equivalent. While information is not 
available on reserves of oats and other 
grain, if farmers carried reserves pro-
portionate to corn, an additional 30 
feed units would have been available. 
Since corn and hay reserves amounted 
to about 220 feed units, this would 
make the total reserve of feedstuffs 
equal to about 250 feed units or rough-
ly 10 percent of feed requirements. 
These estimates, of course, are subject 
to substantial error. Nevertheless, a 
liberal allowance for error would still 
lead to the conclusion that farmers as 
a group carried a comparatively small 
aggregate feed reserve in relation to 
the requirements of their livestock pro-
gram. Since a large proportion of 
farmers had small net holdings of cash 
and other liquid non-farm resources, 
a substantial decline in crop yields, due 
to bad weather, would force major ad-
justments in long-range livestoclr plans 
unless producers resorted to borrow-
ing." 
FERTILIZER AND LIME 
Data on the expected effects on 
yields from the application of fertilizer 
and lime are summarized in tables 35 
and 36. Only about 43 percent of the 
farmers in the sample applied fertilizer 
in 1948. These farmers applied an av-
erage of 66 pounds per acre on corn, 
254 pounds on oats, and 23 pounds on 
hay. Most farmers anticipated a "re-
sidual effect" on the yields of subse-
quent crops. While an average response 
of 3.45 bushels per acre was expected 
from the application to corn, farmers 
expected residual effects to increase 
subsequent oat yields by 1.05 ,bushels 
and hay by 0.06 tons. In contrast to 
~d upon information collected dur-
ing the Initial survey, about 40 percent 
of the farmers reporting had net hold-
ings of cash and other liquid non-farm 
resources (bonds, stocks, accounts re-
ceivable, and loan values of life Insur-
ance) of less than $400 In August 1947. 
TABI.E 35. EXPECTED YIELD EFFECTS FRO:'.[ FERTILIZER APPLICATlON 
FOR FAR:'.[ERS APPLYING FERTILIZER IN THE SPRI~G 
OF 1948 JU="'E 1948 SURVEY.' 
Applied to corn ApplIed to oats Applied to hay 
followed by . followed by followed by 
oats and hay hay and corn corn and oats 
Quantltr applied per 
65.6 264.1 23.4 acre pounds) 
Expected increase In 
3.4 3.4 0.2 corn yield (bushels) 
Expected increase in 
1.0 5.7 0.4 oat yield (bushels) 
Expected Increase In 
0.6 26 0.4 hay yield (tons) 
• Approximately 43 percent of th .. farmers sampled aplllled. fertilizer III the sprmg 
of 1948. 
TABLE 36. EXPECTED YIELD EFFECTS FHO)I THE APPLICATION OF LurE, JUNE 1948 SURVEY. 
Percent of 
total of 
186 
farmers 
64.1 
Farmers with fields seeded to oats as a nurse crop' 
Those who limed these fields in the past 3 years 
Exnected Expected Expected chang-ein 
Tons of change in change in the yip-Id Average lime the yield the yield of the first 
acres applied of oats of hay corn crop limed per acre due to due to due to liming liming liming (bu./A.) (tons/A.) (bu.j A.) 
22.6 2.7 3.4 0.5 5.6 
Those who did NOT lime these fields 
in the past 3 years 
Expected Expected Expected 
Percent of change in chang-ein change in 
total of the yield the yield the yield 
186 of oats of hay of the first ~ 
farmers if Hmed if limed corn crop (bu./A.) (tonsl A.) if Hmed (bu.jA.) 
35.8 3.0 0.4 6.1 
• Each of the 186 farmers in the sample had some acreage seeded to oats as a nurse crop. 
00 
-> 
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experimental results, farmers general-
ly expected fertilizer applied to hay to 
have little effect on increasing subse-
quent grain yields. No follow·up was 
made to determine how producers re-
lated fertilizer-yield expectations to 
realizations. 
Almost tiro-thirds of the group had 
applied lime to their oats for the bene-
fit of new seedings during the preced-
ing 3 years. While farmers expected 
lime to be as effective as fertilizer in 
increasing oat yields, they anticipated 
the effects to be most beneficial in im-
proving grass and legume stands, and, 
hence, eventually in increasing corn 
~·ields. Farmers applying lime to their 
oats-seeding crop-an average of 2.7 
tons per acre-expected an average in-
crease in corn yields following hay of 
about 5.6 bushels per acre. 
The yield increases expected by 
farmers who used lime were not mate-
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riaIly different from those expected by 
farmers who did not use lime. Thus, 
it's impossible to attribute failure to 
apply lime to lack of lmowledge and in-
formation. However, several other fac-
tors help explain this. Some of the 
farmers who had not limed during the 
preceding 3 years had applied lime 
ear!ier. On some of these farms soil 
tests had indicated additional lime was 
not needed. 
:.\lore important was capital ration-
ing wherein the operator was limited 
in funds and even though he expected 
the use of lime to be profitable he tend-
ed to use his limited capital for invest-
ments which would give a higher or 
more certain return. Furthermore, 
some farmers considered the returns 
from lime to be uncertain because seed-
ings might fail to catch and as a re-
sult the effects on hay and corn yields 
might not fully materialize. 
ENTERPRISE UNCERTAINTY AND LIVESTOCK PRODUCTION 
All livestock enterprises involve 
some technical and price uncertainty. 
It is generally recognized, however, 
that some involve more uncertainty 
than others. If net return expecta: 
tions (most probable net return) from 
two enterprises are comparable, farm-
ers will tend to select the one which 
they believe has less uncertainty. Thus, 
selection of livestock enterprises on a 
farm will be partl~T conditioned by the 
relative amounts of uncertainty at-
tached to different enterprises by the 
operator. 
Farmers were asked to rank dair)--
ing, beef cattle feeding, beef cattle rais-
ing and hog production with respect to 
the degree of uncertainty which they 
attached to these enterprises. The re-
sults are summarized in table 37. 
A majority of the farmers rated beef 
cattle feeding as the most uncertain of 
the four enterprises compared. About 
88 percent of the group stated that beef 
cattle feeding was more uncertain than 
dairying. Ninety-seven percent said 
that feeding beef cattle involved more 
uncertainty than raising them. On the 
other hand, a smaller proportion (71 
percent) indicated that beef cattle feed-
ing was more uncertain than hog pro-
duction. 
The hog enterprise was considered 
1110re uncertain than either beef cattle 
or dairying. About two-thirds of the 
group thought hogs involved more un-
certainty than beef cattle raising, and 
about 79 percent stated that hogs en-
tailed more uncertainty than dairying. 
Of the 160 farmers comparing the 
uncertainty of beef cattle raising and 
dairying, 86 believed dairying involved 
more uncertainty while 74 believed 
that beef .cattle raising was more un-
certain. However, this difference was 
not statistically significant."" The sam-
ple evidence does not reject the hypoth-
esis that farmers attach the same de-
gree of uncertainty to dairying as beef 
cattle raising. 
A group of six farm management 
specialists were also asked to rank 
these enterprises with respect to the 
degree of uncertainty in Southern Iowa. 
The specialists all agreed that beef cat-
tle feeding involved more uncertainty 
than hogs. dairying and beef cattle 
raising. Their views were consistent 
with the majority of farmers. While 
ro The adjusted value of chi-square was 
0.75 compared to the tabular value of 
3.84 at the 5 percent level of probability. 
Larger values than 0.75 occur In ran-
dom samples from a population with 
equal numbers about 40 percent of the 
time. 
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TABLE 37. SUBJECTIVE EVALUATION OF THE DEGREE OF UNCERTAIl'ITY 
ATTACHED TO SELEC'l'ED LIVESTOCK ENTERPRISES. 
Enterprise comparison and uncertainty ordering Number I Percent answering answering 
Hogs vs. dairying 162 I Uncertainty greater for hogs than for dairying 79 Uncertainty greater for dairying than for hogs 21 
164 Hogs VS. beef cattle feeding 
Uncertainty greater for hogs than for beef cattle feeding 29 
Uncertainty greater for heef cattle feeding than for hogs 71 
Dalrv vs. beef ca ttle raisin" 160 
Uncer!ainty greater for dairying than for beef cattle 
ralsmg 54 
Uncertainty greater for beef cattle raising than for 
dairying' 46 
175 Beef cattle raising vs. beef cattle feeding 
Uncertainty greater for heef cattle raising than for beef 
cattle feeding • 3 
Uncertainty greater for beef cattle feeding than for beef 
cattle raising 97 
Hogs vs. heef cattle raising 172 
Uncerta!nty greater for hog" than for beef cattle raising 67 
Uncertamty greater for heef cattle raising than for hogs 33 
182 Dairying vs. beef ca ttle feeding 
Uncertainty greater for dairying than for beef cattle 
feeding 12 
Uncertainty greater for beef cattle feeding than for 
88 dairying 
they also unanimously agreed that hog 
production was more uncertain than 
dairying, only five out of the six 
thought hogs involved more uncertain· 
ty than beef cattle raising. There was 
also less agreement among farmers on 
the laUer ranking. Four of the six 
specialists stated that dairying in-
volved more uncertainty than beef cat· 
tIe raising. There was no statistically 
significant difference between dairying 
and beef cattle raising among farmers. 
Because of uncertainty differences, 
farmers would have to expect a larger 
net return from feeding cattle than 
from raising them in order to increase 
output proportionately. A relatively 
higll most probable net return from 
feeding cattle will attract the farmer 
who is not reluctant to assume risk, 
but not the farmer who has a great 
aversion for uncertainty bearing-
since he believes he can't "afford to 
take a chance." Farmers with small 
amounts of equity capital seldom feed 
cattle even though the expected net reo 
turn may be unusually high compared 
with other enterprises. 
PRODUCTION PLANS AND THEIR MODIFICATION 
While this study was primarily de-
signed to focus on farmers' price and 
technical expectations, an effort was 
made to obtain certain descriptive in-
formation dealing with annual produc· 
tion plans and short·term modifications 
in these plans. Since the study ex· 
tended only over a 2-year period, the 
basis for relating expectations to plans 
was altogether too limited to be satis· 
factory. 
The farm resource organization ob-
served in a given year reflects to a 
large extent previous decisions made 
in accordance with some particular 
long·range production plan which has 
been fashioned from long-term expecta· 
tions. These decisions have tended to 
set the size of the farm, the form of 
major capital investments in buildings, 
machinery and equipment, and the gen-
eral characteristics of the crop and 
livestock programs. This results in a 
relatively inflexible short-run plan. 
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Within these limits the farmer has, 
however. certain short-term opportuni-
ties to modify his production pattern 
and resource combinations. Whether 
he makes use of these technical oppor-
tunities depends on a number of con-
siderations including his short-term 
expectations and the degree of uncer-
tainty which he attaches to them. In 
addition, it will depend on whether he 
believes last year's (short-run) plans 
are consistent with his expectations for 
the coming year. If last year's plans 
were well adapted to realized values 
and if values for the coming year are 
expected to deviate from last year's 
realized values, expectations may 
prompt a modification in production 
plans. However, if last year's plans 
turned out to be inconsistent with re-
alized values but are reasonably well 
adapted to expectations, deviations be-
tween last year's realized values and 
expectations for the coming year could. 
not be expected to cause a revision in 
plans. 
There may be so great a degree of 
subjective uncertainty attached to 
short-run expectations that except un-
der unusual conditions, there is little 
basis for deciding what modifications 
in plans are appropriate. Evidence of 
large ranges in expected prices and of 
substantial forecasting errors among 
individual farmers suggests that this 
might very well be a common occur-
rence." In such a situation the pro-
ducer may decide to follow his long-
range plan without attempting to in-
troduce short-run modifications. Unex-
pected variations in crop yields and 
other technical rates may generate reo 
visions in the farmer's crop and live-
stock programs; but such modifications 
are unplanned in the sense that the 
variations are not fully taken into ac-
count before developing short-run pro-
duction plans. Much additional Te-
search wlll be needed before it will be 
possible to specify within acceptable 
limits of error the relationships be-
tween farmers' expectations and plans. 
.. Refers to the evidence presented in 
the section entitled "Farmers' Price Ex-
pectations." 
ANNUAL CROP AND LIVESTOCK 
PLANS 
In order to llleasure the short-run 
c~anges which takQ place in produc-
tion patterns, farmers' production 
plans-obtained during tho. course of 
each survey-were comparea with op-
erations during the preceding aNi cur-
rent years. A summary of this in-
formation is giVen in table 38. 
The average of farmers' production 
plans for 1948 and 1-949 did not differ 
materially from the average of actual 
operations during the preceding year. 
Farmers normally made only minor re-
visions in their production plans be-
tween December and the following 
June. However, the aggregation of 
plans obscures the adjustments made 
by individual farmers. In the particu-
lar years under study, the planned in-
creases of some farmers were nearly 
offset by planned decreases of others. 
Even though the "average action" of 
an entire group of farmers suggests no 
change in plans or operations, it is 
possible for a large amount of individ-
ual offsetting adjustment to occur. 
These changes may be prompted by in-
consistent expectations with the result 
that, although average plans have not 
changed and realized prices have re-
mained constant, many indiVidual 
plans are badly out of gear with real-
ized prices. 
Table 39 suggests that a substantial 
amount of offsetting adjustment does 
occur. It shows the average absolute 
(disregarding signs) changes in pro-
duction plans and operations. Where-
as in table 38 farmers in December 
1947 were planning to increase their 
corn acreage by an average of 0.8 acres 
O. e., from 35.8 to 36.6). table 39 shows 
that the average adjustment made by 
individual farmers independently of di· 
rection was 12.8 acres. By June of 
1948, the average absolute change 
planned for corn had been revised to 
where it differed from the actual acre-
age in 1947 by 6.0 acres. 
Similarly, table 40 shows that when 
the mean of adjustments is computed 
for the sample-with positive and neg-
ative signs disregarded-the actual 
change in production is large relative 
to the change in the mean quantities 
\ 
TABLE 38. CROP AND LIVESTOCK PRODUCTION PLANS FOR 1948 AND 1949: AVERAGE FOR ALL"'·FARMS. 
---------
------
-------
Production Production 
\tual Actual 
planned for 1948 Actual planned for 1949 at time of at time of Commodity Unit production production IlroducUon 
1947 Dec. 1947 June 1948 1948 Dec. 1948 June 1949 1949 
survey survey survey Hurvey 
.......... 
Corn Acses 35.8 36.6 36.3 42.4 37.3 35.5 37.1 
Oats 18.4 21.6 21.4 22.4 28.4 27.7 25.6 
Soybeans .. 7.0 6.0 6.1 6.0 4.5 4.0 4.0 
Other "rain " 3.6 5.3 5.7 6.5 5.6 5.7 5.8 Legume hay 10.5 11.5 10.9 11.0 12.6 11.9 11.5 
Other hay .. 24.8 22.5 20.7 21.1 16.8 18.0 17.4 
Rotation pasture ., 2.6 2.8 2.8 2.4 2.5 2.7 4.9 
Permanent pasture .. 95.0 93.3 95.9 84.6 94.9 95.8 93.7 
Litters spring oil1;s Number 5.2 4.5 4.4 4.4 5.9 5.9 5.5 
Litters fall pigs .. 2.0 2.3 2.2 2.0 2.9 3.1 3.1 
Milk cows .. 6.0 6.2 6.4 5.6 6.0 6.0 5.9 
Stock cows to calve .. 7.0 7.6 7.3 7.6 8.2 8.4 8.2 
Feeder or stock cows 
to sell .. 3.6 4.1 4.3 5.4 5.2 5.2 4.5 
Ewes to lamb .. 10.4 15.1 14.7 13.3 12.3 12.1 11.0 
Laying hens .. 115.2 118.1 119.6 106.5 126.4 125.2 99.5 
Chickens raised " 191.3 159.4 158.7 143.3 207.7 200.6 214.9 
Turkeys or other 
.. poultry 5.3 6.3 1.2 0.2 0.9 0.9 0.4 
Grain-fed cattle .. 1.5 1.9 1.6 2.2 2.6 2.8 2.1 
-------
DO 
DO 
t.:> 
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TABLE 39. ABSOLUTE CHANGES PLANNED FOR 1948 AND 1949 .• 
Changes planned for I Changes planned for 1948 (increase or 1949 (increase or decrease from 1947 " decrease from 1948 Commodity Unit actual) actual) 
Dec. 1947 June 1948 Dec. 1"148 I June 1949 survey survey survey survey 
Corn Acres 12.8 8.8 13.4 6.0 Oat~ 10.9 4.3 13.5 
-.7 Soybeans " 4.4 2.4 3.7 1.1. 
Other grain " 5.7 1.7 4.6 0.8 Legume hay " 6.9 5.0 8.4 2.9 
Other hay " 11.1 5.3 10.0 4.3 
Rotation pasture " 3.1 2.2 1.2 2.8 
Permanent pasture .. 8.8 7.6 12.0 6.6 
Lit tel'S s pring pigs Nu")pers 2.9 1.5 2.5 3.1 
Litters fall pigs 1.3 1.5 1.4 1.7 
:\Tilk cows .. 1.3 1.3 L~ 0.7 
Stock cows to calve " 1.9 1.7 1.6 0.9 
Feeder or stock cows 
to sel! " 2.6 3.8 3.5 2.7 Grain-fed cattle " 1.0 0.8 1.7 1.4 
Ewes to lamb .. 4.9 3.2 4.2 2.5 
Laying hens " 31.3 30.4 32.6 27.7 
Chickens to be pur-
" chased 68.1 35.9 74.3 67.4 Turkeys or other 
poultry .. 1.1 0.1 0.7 0.9 
• Mean of Increases or decreases with sign of change disregarded. 
produced by all farms in the sample. 
While the changes.in the average num-
ber of different livestock classes be-
tween 1947 and 1948 and 1948 and 1949 
were small, the average of the individ-
ual adjustments disregarding sign 
were in most cases several times 
larger. 
REASONS FOR CHANGE IN PLANS 
AND OPERATION 
At the time of each surVey farmers 
who planned to revise their operations 
were asked the reason for the change. 
Subjective questions of this nature are, 
of course, difficult to interpret. Farm-
TABLE 40. ABSOLUTE CHANGES IN PLANNED PRODUCTION. 1948 AND 1949.* 
Commodity Unit Actual change Actual change 1947 to 1948 1948 to 1949 
1. Corn Bu. 17.23 15.94 
2. Oats 11.88 12.21 
3. Soybeans .. 5.06 4.37 
4. Legume hay " 7.95 9.21 
5. Other hay .. 12.01 12.23 
6. Litters spring pigs Nu~ber 3.06 2.71 
7. Litters fall pigs 1.89 2.17 
8. Stock cows to calve " 2.63 2.77 
9. Milk cows " 1.95 1.90 
10. Stock cows ~lus milk COWS" .. 3.49 3.87 
11. Feeder or stock cows to sell " 4.63 5.35 
12. Grain-fed cattle .. 1.13 3.22 
13. Ewes to lamb .. 
I 
6.75 6.46 
14. Sheep and lambs fed .. 5.73 0.89 
15. Laying hens .. 48.46 42.73 
16 . Chickens raised .. 118.59 124.01 
• Changes from actual production in pre\"lous year with sign" of change disregarded. 
TABU'; 41. 
Crop 
Corn 
Oats 
Soybeans 
Other yrain 
Legume hay 
Other hay 
Hotation pasture 
Permanent pasture 
Corn 
Oats 
Soybeans 
Other grain 
Legume hay 
Other hay 
Rotation paHture 
Permanent pasture 
HE.\SONS FOR DIl~I"J<JHENCES IN PLANNED CROP ACREAGES IN 1948 AND ACTi'>,\L CROP 
'rot'll 
number 
of farmers 
planning a 
change 
158 
162 
57 
64 
87 
108 
31 
45 
125 
96 
45 
30 
65 
79 
27 
75 
Chang-ein 
cOHt-price 
outlook 
ACREAGE IN 1947. \ 
reHources . rotation . 'No single 
or Change III and soil \Veather Familv l\hscel- \iefinite 
resource tenure conser- laneous teason 
plans . vation \ 
Change in Crop 1
Percent Percent Percent Percent Percent Percent Percent Percent 
answering I answering answering answering answering answering I answering answering of those of tho~e of those of those of tho"e of tho"e of those of those 
For planned changcs indicated in Dec. 1947 survey as compared to 1947 actual 
5.43 
7,45 
16.47 
4.59 
3.62 
3.70 
7.79 
1.79 
11.84 
7.45 
12.31 
16.85 
0.27 
4.33 
16:57 
8.51 
17.')5 
14.15 
17.63 
4.44 
14.46 
12.49 
27.25 
31.88 
42.99 
53.07 
23.01 
28.33 
48.84 
53.97 
0.00 
7.93 
8.69 
6.15 
7.~4 
6.16 
0.00 
0.18 
0.00 
0.00 
2.93 
1.85 
0.00 
3.22 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.63 
0.07 
2.72 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
1.10 
10.43 
9.S1 
20.52 
36.40 
32.81 
23.72 
48.39 
48.79 
For planned changes indicated in June 1948 survey as compared to Dec. 1947 planH 
7.95 
1.63 
15.44 
0.00 
6.30 
1.72 
0.83 
2.77 
6.82 
11.40 
8.05 
35.28 
0.47 
5.56 
0.00 
5.08 
16.52 
18.82 
13.77 
19.47 
23.06 
12.09 
11.05 
20.70 
8.40 
9.27 
1 fi.64 
5.83 
12.06 
18.17 
45.15 
6.60 
37.10 
22.51 
25.42 
8.28 
36.82 
38.06 
17.10 
16.46 
0.80 
1.17 
0.00 
0.00 
1.48 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
5.51 
13.24 
2.53 
12.61 
6.65 
0.03 
4.38 
17.26 
16.90 
21.96 
19.16 
18.53 
13.19 
15.37 
21.48 
31.13 
co 
co 
"'" 
ers themselves frequently cannot clear-
ly interpret their own decisions because 
they are influenced by a complex of 
variables, some of which are not easily 
translated and classified. While these 
difficulties were no greater than gen-
erally encountered in other attitude 
studies, they should be kept in mind in 
the interpretations of subsequent 
tables. 
CROPS 
Reasons given by farmers for the 
changes in plans were classified as (1) 
changes in the price-cost outlook, in-
cluding the prices of products and the 
prices of materials and resources used 
in production; (2) changes in re-
sources or resource plans relating to 
the quantities of labor, land, feed and 
capital available to the farmer; (3) 
changes in tenure including a change 
to a smaller or larger farm or the rent-
ing of an entirely different farm; (4) 
changes due alone to crop rotation se-
quences or the adoption of soil conser-
vation measures; (5) changes and an-
ticipated changes in weather; (6) 
changes in family such as illness, 
death or retirement; (7) miscellaneous 
reasons such as development of per-
sonal preference for a product; and 
l8) reasons which could not be classi-
fied because they failed to point to any 
particular phenomenon and the lack of 
any stated reason. 
Table 41 summarizes the reasons 
given for planned changes for 1948 
compared to actual operations in 1947 
as of December 1947 and for revisions 
in plans between December 1947 and 
June 1948. Of the reasons that could 
be interpreted, rotation sequences ac-
counted for the greatest. number of 
changes in crop plans for 1948 as these 
were developed in December 1947. Most 
farmers select a rotation and follow it 
at least through one cycle before major 
changes are made unless weather 
forces them to abandon it temporarily. 
The rotation as part of the long-ran?,e 
crop plan introduces an element of m-
flexibility into short-run plans. Unless 
there are extremely important reasons 
for doing so, the farmer is reluctant to 
set aside his rotation because of the 
longer-run benefits which he expects it 
to produce. 
As might be expected, partly because 
885 
two-fifths of the farms in the area are 
rented and partly because some farm-
ers become owners each year, tenure 
changes were mentioned as the second 
most important reason for changes in 
the crop program. Price relationships 
were fourth in importance. However, 
they undoubtedly would be considered 
far more important for a planning pe-
riod of 10 to 15 years. 
The pattern of reasons was altered 
materially for revisions in plans be-
tween December and June. Farmers 
mentioned weather as the most impor-
tant reason for modifying plans be-
tween these dates. Plans in December 
were typically based upon some con-
ception of "average growing condi-
tions" for the coming year. However, 
by June deviations from average 
weather during the planting period 
and during the early part of the grow-
ing season were known. These devia-
tions had prompted certain revisions 
in crop plans. Changes in tenure were 
again second in importance. This is 
explained partly by the fact that many 
landlords and tenants do not develop 
their joint crop plans until late win-
ter. Furthermore, some tenants in De-
cember are still uncertain about the 
farm they will be operating during the 
coming year. That crop plans in June 
are more clearly formulated than those 
in the preceding December is apparent 
from the smaller proportion of farm-
ers who gave no reason or no distin-
guishable reason for their June revi-
sions as compared to the changes 
planned in the preceding December. 
For the most part the reasons given 
for planned changes from 1948 to 1949 
and for revisions in 1949 plans paral-
lel those of the preceding period (table 
42). Again rotational considerations 
were most frequently mentioned for 
changes planned at the time of the De-
cember and June surveys. Revisions 
in plans between December and June 
were made more often because of 
weather or expected changes in weather 
than for any other reason. 
LIVESTOCK PLANS 
Similar information on reasons for 
changes and planned changes in live-
stock numbers for 1948 is set forth in 
table 43. Price-cost relationships were 
TABLE 42. HEASONS FOR DIFFERENCES IN PLANNED CROP ACREAGES IN 19·19 AND ACTUAL CROP 
ACREAGES IN 1945. 
--- ---
Changeln Crop 
Change in resources Change in rotation "Ii see 1- No Hingle Total cost-price or and <oil 'Veather Family definite 
number outlook resource tenure conser- laneous reason 
Crop of farmers plans vatlon 
planning a 
change Percent Percent Percent Percent Percent Percent Percent Percent 
of those of those of those of those of those of those of those of those 
anH\vering answering answering answering answering answering ans\vering answering 
For planned changes Indicated in December 1948 as compared to 1948 actual 
Corn 150 0.46 6.34 20.32 47.96 0.00 I 1.23 0.00 23.68 
Oats 151 0.61 4.64 14.90 45.35 1.46 1.46 0.00 31.57 
Soyheans 56 8.97 16.20 13.21 38.37 0.00 3.80 0.11 19.35 
Other grain 66 7.82 13.57 6.63 21.80 9.43 0.00 4.97 35.78 
Legume hay 169 0.11 8.16 6.31 59.21 1.09 0.00 3.48 21.63 
Other hay 87 0.11 1.80 17.54 42.94 1.54 1.63 1.80 32.64 
Rotation pasture 21 0.00 7.56 1.11 38.74 0.00 0.00 0.00 52 . .58 
Permanent pasture 48 0.00 1.97 40.35 13.38 1.35 0.00 12.24 30.71 
For planned changes indicated in June 1949 as compared to December 1948 plans 
Corn 107 5.11 3.56 16.64 10.66 34.67 0.65 12.23 16.49 
Oats 103 5.18 12.55 16.01 10.83 30.70 0.66 9.01 15.07 
SO~'beans 40 2.90 21.9S 12.80 '13.04 19.57 2.09 19.24 ·8.37 
Other grain 15 0.00 16.08 16.58 0.00 10.30 0.00 21.11 35.9:1 
Legume hay 51 0.00 7.64 17.08 8.86 37.81 0.00 21.02 7.59 
Other hay 62 0.00 0.00 10.40 2:1.64 36.06 0.00 21.97 7.92 
Rotation paHture 28 11.00 0.00 3.28 63.66 17.30 0.00 15.76 0.00 
i'errnanl'nt naRtUl'f' 62 0.00 4.02 9.00 18.20 22.74 0.00 30.3r. 15.69 
00 
00 
0> 
TABLE 43. REASONS FOR DIFFERENCES IN PLANNED LIVESTOCK NU:\rBERS IN 1948 AND ACTUAL 
L1VESTOCK NU:\fBERS IN 1947. 
- -- ----- ---
- ----- - ._----
-
~-
Changoein Changoein Bi ololrical reHources Changoe to No Ringole 
Total the cost· or another F·amily reasons JlTio.;cel· definite 
nutnher price reSource enternrise (hreedlng. laneous reaHon Kind of of farmers outlook plans etc.) Livestock l)lanninga 
change Percent Perct-'nt Percent Percent Percent Percent Percent 
of tho"e of tllD"e of tho~e of those of tho"e of those of those 
answering an~,\~cring answering an~nvcring anHwel'ing an~nvering an>;wering 
For planned changes in 1948 as eompared to 1947 actual 
Litters spring pigs 121 31.~7 49.64 0.00 0.83 0.99 1.51 15.07 
Li tters fan pigs 69 10.06 60.26 0.00 0.00 2.79 3.67 23.22 
;\Tilk cows 73 17.66 29.68 2.5(1 4.46 ~.5S 1.35 ~5.79 
Rtock cows to calvc 68 4.70 39.37 2.03 0.00 0.00 3.58 50.31 
Feedcr or stoek 
cows to sell 54 1.45 45.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.68 4~.67 
nrain-fed cattl" 27 lG.03 32.37 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 " 1.60 ]';weH to hunb !t3 18.62 fi5.53 1.84 5.14 0.00 4.95 ] 3.92 
Layjn~ hens 70 37.13 27.38 0.00 6.06 0.00 3.50 25.93 
Chicken,; rai"ed 84 ·t5.87 23:57 0.00 0.87 0.00 10.02 19.67 
Turkeys or other 
poultry 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
For planned changes indicated in June 1948 aH compared to Dec. 1947 plans 
Litters Hprlng ]JigH 112 26.74 27.44 0.00 1.67 26.53 5.74 11.88 
Litters fall pigs 84 39.48 32.17 0.00 1.99 9.68 8.41 8.27 
lIIilk cows 101 8.83 57.22 0.00 4.81 4.60 11.38 13.17 
I'tock cows to calve 78 8.11 53.21 0.00 1.57 5.71 13.45 17.96 
Feeder or stock 
cows to sell 81 13.35 24.28 0.00 3.21 0.00 33.74 25.42 
nrain·fed cattle 20 33.99 25.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 32.02 8.87 
Ewes to lamb 56 15.86 10.18 0.00 0.00 10.18 43.24 20.64 
Laying hens 129 9.21 32.52 0.00 4.31 0.00 35.35 18.62 
Chickens raised 137 41.87 23.51 0.00 14.58 4.24 5.43 10.38 
Turkeys or other 
3 poultrv 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
__ (),°L 46.24 fitl.7~ 
00 
00 
-'I 
TABLE 44. REASONS FOR DIFFERENCES IN PLANNED LIVESTOCK NUMBERS IN 1949 AND ACTUAL 
LIVESTOCK NUMBERS IN 1948 
_. 
Changein Change in Biological resources Change to No single 
Total the cost- or another Family reasons J\Jiscel- definite 
number nrice resource enterprise (breeding, laneous reason Kind of of farmers outlook plans etc.) livestock planning a 
change Percent Percent Percent Percent Percent Percent Percent 
of tho~e of those of those of those of tllO"e of tho"e of those 
ans\vering answering an:·nvering anH\vering ans\vering anH\vering an~nvering-
For planned "hanges in 1949 as compared to 1948 actual 
Litters spring pig" 142 20.90 56.87 0.00 1.14 1.71 3.88 15.51 
Litters fall pigs 94 19.92 49.36 1.76 2.33 5.02 2.0S 19.53 
Milk cows 62 18.49 29.87 5.94 7.50 2.95 21.06 14.20 
Stock cows to calve 80 10.54 36.12 4.70 0.00 0.93 21.89 25.84 
Feeder or stock 
cows to sell 85 3.55 23.73 3.83 1.29 0.00 21.56 46.04 
Grain-fed cattle 43 8.04 38.53 0.00 2.85 0.00 20.69 29.90 
Ewes to lamb 48 12.73 21.12 0.00 38.33 0.00 17.38 10.44 
Laying hens G6 23.57 31.25 0.00 5.84 0.00 9.42 29.92 
Chickens raised 75 11.67 42.0:! 0.00 12.49 0.00 7.71 26.04 
Turkeys or other 
poultry 2 0.00 50.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 50.00 
For planned production in June 1949 as compared to December 1948 plans 
Litters spring pig;; 97 11.4.4 16.46 3.53 48.26 p.54 6.77 
Litlers fan pig;; 91 19.65 38.17 0.00 1.28 26.13 4.19 9.57 
Milk cows 63 56.64 13.88 1.00 2.85 5.13 14.29 7.21 
Stock cows to calve 57 29.94 22.88 0.00 3.99 2.75 25.08 15.3ti 
Feeder or stock 
cows to sell 54 54.22 ]3.4 7 0.00 0.00 1.23 13.66 lUI 
Grain-fed cattle 31 6.90 0.8] 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.53 1.75 
Ewes to lamb 40 19.23 5.54 1.47 V.OO 17.53 52.26 3.96 
Laying hens 97 35.35 3.22 0.00 1.[,6 0.00 52.63 7.24 
Chickens raised 96 11.59 29.98 1.61 32.11 0.00 10.06 14.65 
rrurkeys or other 
poultry 11 1.66 0.00 
_._-
0.00 6.57 0.00 1.77 0.00 
0<> 
0<> 
0<> 
more important for changes and 
planned changes between years for live-
stocl{ than for crops. While oppor-
tunities for short·term modification in 
long-range livestock plans are general-
ly greater than for crop plans, live-
stock numbers in a particular year are 
quite largely determined by decisions 
made in previous ~·ears." Decisions 
about breeding stock, livestocl{ build-
ings and equipment made in earlier 
periods set technical limits to changes 
in the pattern of livestock production 
in a given year. There are, however, 
important differences between live-
stock classes. For example, technical 
limitations to the expansion of poultry 
and hogs in the short run are less 
than those of dairy and beef cattle. 
Changes in the physical conditions 
of production are often extremely im· 
portant for intra·year or inter-year 
changes in livestock numbers. This 
was particularly true between 1947 
and 1948. The drouth of 1947 sharply 
curtailed forage and grain supplies on 
many of the sample farms which use 
their own feeds and buy or sell only in· 
significant amounts. The scarcity or 
corn prompted most farmers to plan a 
reduction in spring farrowings for 
1948. Some producers planned to de-
crease the numbers of other livestock 
also. 
Inasmuch as many farmers in the 
area do not buy or sell appreciable 
quantities of feed, they gave the de· 
crease in feed production as their rea-
l!5 'l'he degree of flexibility for adjust-
ment within a short-run producing plant 
depends quite largely on the degree of 
flexibility and adaptability previously 
built into the plant. For details on this 
pOint see Earl Heady. Uncertainty in 
price relationships and resource aHo-
cation In the short-run. Jour. Farm 
Eeon. Vol. 32. 
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son for adjusting plans rather than the 
increase in feed values relative to live-
stock values, which was, of course, gen-
erated largely by the widespread 
drouth. As a consequence, their rea· 
sons were classified as changes in re-
sources or resource plans and not as 
changes in price·cost prospects. Ten· 
ure changes were far less important as 
a reason for changes in livestocl{ plans 
than for changes in crop plans. 
An examination of the reasons for 
the changes in plans between Decem· 
bel' 1947 and June 1948 for 1948 pro-
duction reveals that changes in re-
sources and resource plans were less 
important in June than in the preced-
ing December. Changes or anticipated 
changes in the price-cost situation and 
changes related to biological phenom-
ena were relatively more important in 
the revisions in plans between Decem-
ber and June. By the time of the June 
survey farmers were aware of the ef-
fects of unforeseen occurrences such 
as the failure of sows or other female 
animals to breed, the development of 
abortion, erysipelas, brucellosis and 
other diseases, the loss of animals at 
birth or before weaning, and other 
"natural" phenomena affecting live-
stock production. It is again evident 
that fewer farmers were unable to give 
a definite reason for their changes in 
June than in December. This suggests, 
as in the case of crops, that farmers 
were more sure of the changes and 
their reasons at the later date. 
The data for 1949 are very similar 
to those of 1948 (table 44). Instead 
of a drouth as in 1947, favorable grow-
ing conditions in 1948 contributed to 
a bumper feed crop. Many farmers 
were planning to increase livestock 
numbers because of greater quantities 
of feed. 
